JAGTAR SINGH Vs. BALBIR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The brief and relevant facts are that there was an agreement of sale between the parties dated 19th July, 1959, with regard to H. No. 592-R (B-XVIII)-387, Model Town, Ludhiana. The sale price was fixed at Rs. 11,000/- out of which an amount of Rs. 5,000/- was paid in advance by the purchaser, i.e., Jagtar Singh, petitioner, and possession was delivered to him. An additional amount of Rs. 1,000/- was paid by him on 2nd August, 1959, as per terms of the agreement; the balance amount of Rs. 5,000/- was left to be paid before the Sub Registrar. The respondent/vendor Balbir Singh filed a suit for mandatory injunction against Jagtar Singh, the vendee, which was decreed by the trial Court on 31st January, 1966. However, the said decree was set aside in appeal on 16th May, 1966. Balbir Singh, vendor, thereupon filed RSA No. 1207/6 in this Court in which a compromise was entered into between the parties and in view of that the appeal was dismissed on 6th December, 1976. According to the said compromise a sum of Rs. 16,000/- was paid in cash to Balbir Singh in this Court. In addition, a sum of Rs, 1,000/- was paid to him on account of expenses for the execution of the sale deed. After recording the statements of the parties, this Court passed the following order :-

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the view taken by the trial Court was wholly wrong, illegal and it has, thus, acted illegally and with material irregularities in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In support of his contention he referred to (Sahu) Shyam Lal V. M. Shayamlal, 1933 AIR(All) 649 Lal Singh V. Mohan Singh and others, 1934 AIR(Lah) 623 Sodhi Mohinder Singh V. Shrimati Rajinder Kaur and others, 1966 CurLJ 91 and Amarnath Radha Ram and others V. Smt. Malan w/o L. Ram Chand, 1954 AIR(P&H) 259 On the other hand, the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor submitted that the order dated 6th December, 1976 passed on compromise in the High Court was not executable and, therefore, the view taken by the executing Court in this behalf was perfectly legal and valid. According to the learned counsel, the said order was passed prior to the amendment in Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and since the compromise related to matters extraneous to the suit, the same could not be incorporated in the decree in a suit, particularly, when the compromise was not the subject matter of the suit as such. In support of his contention, he referred to Smt. Dharmon V. Firm Hira Lal Sheo Parshad and others,1975 RajdhaniLR 185; Munshi Ram V. Banwari Lal deceased, 1962 AIR(SC) 903 and Bimal Kumar Gayen and others V. Amiya Gopal Mondal and others, 1975 AIR(Cal) 387

(3.) After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the case-law cited at the Bar, I am of the considered opinion that the view taken by the executing Court in this behalf is wrong and illegal and it has thus, acted illegally and with material irregularities in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The order passed on 6th December, 1976 by this Court after recording the statements of the parties has already been reproduced earlier. It clearly stipulates that the respondent, i.e. Balbir Singh shall get the sale deed executed within one month from today. That being so, it was obligatory on the part of Balbir Singh to get the sale deed executed, particularly, when the entire amount of Rs. 16,000/- had been paid to him in the High Court itself. Not only that, his subsequent suit for declaration that he could not be called upon to execute the sale deed in favour of Jagtar Singh in respect of the property in dispute unless and until he had been paid a sum of Rs. 24,000/- more, had already been dismissed. The said matter had come in this Court in Regular Second appeal No. 55 of 1980 which was dismissed on 14th March, 1980. It was observed, therein that "the matter came up before the High Court in R.S.A. No. 1207 of 1966 decided on 6th December, 1976, when Rs. 16,000/- were paid to the appellant in Court and he agreed to execute the sale deed in favour of the respondent within one month from 6th December, 1976. Instead of abiding by this condition, the appellant filed the suit out of which the instant second appeal arises."