CHANCHAL SINGH Vs. PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition arises out of the order dated 8.12.1987 passed by the learned Additional Judge, Amritsar in an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal by the plaintiff. The revision petitioner contends that the suit of the petitioner was decreed on 4.2.1987, although partly, but he was made to understand that the suit had been decreed in toto. Under the said impression, he applied for obtaining a copy of the judgment alone on 5.2.1987 which was delivered to him on 4.3.1987 when he acquired the knowledge that the suit had been decreed partly. There was still limitation for filing the appeal. He could file the appeal before 31.3.1987. Instead of preferring the appeal, he applied for obtaining certified copy of the decree against which he wanted to file an appeal which was prepared on 11.5.1987 and delivered to him on 15.5.1987, 16th and 17th of May 1987 happened to be Saturday and Sunday respectively on which days, the courts were closed. Consequently, the appeal was filed on 18th May, 1987. There is no dispute that the appellant was entitled to exclude the time taken for obtaining the copy of the Judgment. Having applied for certified copy of the decree-sheet on 30.3.1987, i.e. within limitation, he was entitled to exclude the time taken for preparation of copy of the decree-sheet while calculating the period of limitation. Thus, the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree sheet could be excluded while calculating the limitation. I find support for this view of mine from Ranzor Singh v. Secretary of State, AIR 1926 Lahore 509 wherein it has been observed :-

(2.) I agree with the observations made above. Keeping in view the facts of the present case, there is hardly a delay of a week or so. Law of limitation has to be construed liberally as observed in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katigi and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353. There is no mala fide, nor can any such mala fide be inferred from the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, particularly the fact that immediately after taking delivery of copy of the decree on 15.5.87 and 16th and 17th May, 1987, being Saturday and Sunday respectively, the appeal was preferred on 18.5.1987. In view of the aforesaid view of the Supreme Court. I am construing the provisions of the Limitation Act liberally. The meticulous explanation of delay for each day is not of much significance, particularly when there is no mala fide attributed to the appellant. The law of limitation cannot be used to penalise the litigating public. The object should be to do substantial justice, rather than declining justice to the people on hyper-technical pleas particularly when the relief is being sought against the State or State authorities.

(3.) THE parties are directed to appear in the appellant Court on the 19th of October, 1989. Order accordingly.