JITENDER KUMAR Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Children Court at Hissar. The material facts are a case under Sections 406/381 of Indian Penal Code was registered against the petitioner on 15.7.1986 at police station Fatehabad, District Hissar. The challan was put in under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 21-7-1986. The trial had been going on in the Children Court and the next date fixed for prosecution evidence was 25-1-1989 at the time of filing this petition. As the trial had not been concluded within the period of six months fixed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sheela Barse v. Union of India, 1988(2) Recent Criminal Reports 262: AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1773, a petition was moved before the Children Court for quashing the proceedings. The ]earned Chief Judicial Magistrate exercising the powers of Children Court dismissed the said petition with the observation that the decision in Sheela Barse's case (supra) applied to children in jail which was not the case here.

(2.) THERE is no dispute that the petitioner is a child Learned counsel appearing for the State was unable to point out anything in the judgment to warrant the conclusion that it applied to only children in the jail, In Sheela Barse's case (supra) their Lordships referred to Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 and observed that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus if an accused was not tried speedily and his case remained pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated unless, of course, the trial is held up on account of some interim order passed by the superior Court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. It was further observed that the consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right. It was in this background laid down that in cases against the children for offence punishable with less than seven years imprisonment the Investigation should be completed within three months and the trial should be completed within six months. Where these time limits are exceeded the trial was liable to be quashed. In the facts of the present case which have not been controverted the investigation was completed in the time but the trial has been continuing for an unreasonably long time. The proceedings in question are, therefore, quashed, Order accordingly.