INDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner was sentenced to death by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda, vide his order dated 19th March 1959. The sentence of death was commuted to imprisonment for life by the Governor of Punjab on 12th March 1970 on a mercy petition. The petitioner alleges having undergone 13 years 4 months and 10 days substantive sentence, besides earning 6 years 2 months and 20 days by way of remission It is, thus, maintained that the petitioner in all had undergone more than 20 years of sentence including remissions. The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for enforcing Punjab Government instructions embodied in letter No. 403-6JJ-76/3456 dated 30th January, 1976, providing that cases of convicts whose death sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment on mercy petitions could be considered for remission if they had undergone 14 years substantive and 20 years including remissions.

(2.) IN the return filed by the State by way of affidavit of Shri R. M. Bassi, Deputy Secretary to Government, Punjab, Department of Home Affairs and Justice, it is admitted that on 20th June, 1988 the petitioner convict had undergone actual imprisonment of 13 years 8 months and 16 days, besides having earned 12 years 9 months and one day by way of remissions. It is further contended that the petitioner has no right to be released prematurely unless lie has undergone 20 years of substantive imprisonment excluding remissions. However, the State Government may consider his case for premature release after he had undergone 14 years substantive imprisonment without remission.

(3.) A persual of the above referred instructions leaves no doubt that the State Government may consider the premature release of the convict whose death sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment no mercy petition after he had undergone 14 years actual imprisonment or 20 years including remissions provided his conduct remained good throughout in the jail. In the case in hand it is not disputed that the conduct of the petitioner had remained good throughout his confinement in the jail and that by today he has undergone 14 years of substantive imprisonment and 20 years (including remissions).