BHAG SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This order will also dispose of Civil Writ Petition No. 7545 of 1989 as the question involved is common in both the petitions. The petitioners are working in Government Colleges/Schools and Public Health Department located at village Jandiala which were estimated within eight kilometres from the limits of Municipal Committees/Corporations. Vide Annexure P-4 dated 8th December, 1986, it was certified that village Jandiala, Tehsil Phillaur, District Jalandhar is within eight kilometres from the Municipal Corporation Jalandhar by the road side, on the basis of Tehsildar Phillaur and Jalandhar. As a result thereof, the petitioners were allowed to draw house rent allowance on the basis of that certificate. Later on, vide Annexure P-5, the then Deputy Commissioner, Jalandhar ordered that the certificate issued vide his office letter dated 8th December, 1986 (Annexure P-4) that village Jandiala is within eight kilometres from Municipal Corporation, Jalandhar is hereby cancelled as the distance between Jalandhar and Jandiala is 13.20 kilometers. It is this letter of the Deputy Commissioner (Annexure P-5) which has been challenged in these writ petitions. According to the petitioners, before any order such as Annexure P-5 could be passed, the petitioners were entitled to a notice to show as to what was the real distance as regards village Jandiala. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, since the said order Annexure P-5 affected the civil rights of the parties, they were entitled to show cause notice before the earlier order Annexure P-4 was cancelled. In support of his contention, he referred to a Supreme Court Judgment in Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar and others, 1989 AIR(SC) 620On the other hand, the learned Advocate-General, Punjab appearing for the respondents submitted that no civil right of the petitioners has such was affected. House Rent Allowance was allowed by way of concession and the same could be withdrawn at any time without issuing any show cause notice. In support of his contention, he referred to a Division Bench judgment of this Court directly dealing with this point in Gurmeet Singh Gill Agriculture Inspector and others v. The Chief Agricultural Officer Ropar and others, 1987 3 SLR 488in which a reference has also been made to The State of Punjab etc. v. Harnek Singh and others, LPA No. 106 of 1977, decided on 1980.

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the case law cited at the Bar. Raghunath Thakur's case , a person was black listed and the Supreme Court held that the said order has civil consequences for future business of the person concerned and therefore before he could be black listed he was entitled to a hearing even though the rules did not provide so expressly. The ratio of the said judgment of Supreme Court is that if an order affecting civil rights of a person to be passed, then before the passing of the same, he is entitled to a hearing. As regards the present case, house rent allowance was allowed by way of concession and the petitioners had no right thereto. If subsequently, this concession was withdrawn, the petitioners were not entitled to any notice as such. This matter directly came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Gurmeet Singh Gill's case , wherein it was held that the payment of city compensatory allowance to the petitioners by the State Government was by way of concession. It was open to the Government to withdraw the said concession. Nobody could urge that the Government before deciding to withdraw the concession should have heard any such government employee. The position is not different when a given right is created by the statutory provision or executive instructions. The given statute or the executive instructions could be amended or withdrawn in a manner as to do away with the right created by earlier provisions of the statute or instructions. Nobody could contend that before modifying the statute or modifying the executive instructions the beneficiaries under the existing statute and executive instructions should be afforded an opportunity." Since the said judgment of the Division Bench is directly on the point under consideration, the same is binding on this Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is clearly distinguishable. Consequently, both the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.