(1.) Mewa Singh, petitioner, was elected Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Chhatar. During his tenure as Sarpanch, Bali son of Tula respondent No. 4 allegedly lodged a false complaint against him before the Deputy Commissioner, Jind, who appointed the Additional General Assistant, Jind to hold enquiry into the allegations. The Enquiry Officer after recording the statements of Risala son of Phula, Ballu son of Haria and Ratia son of Sheola, submitted his report dated 3rd Jan., 1981 (copy Annexure-P1) to the Deputy Commissioner, exonerating the petitioner, but the order passed by the latter on this report is not within the knowledge of the petitioner as the Copying Agency on his application had reported that the file had not been received from the concerned office by then. Under these circumstances, the petitioner alleges that he was exonerated of the charges. Thereafter, the petitioner was again charge-sheeted by the Director, Panchayats, respondent No. 2 and appointed the General Assistant, Jind as an Enquiry Officer. It may be mentioned here that the relevant charges which ultimately survived were relating to the embezzlement of Rs.13,900.00 the sale proceeds of the Kikar trees belonging to the Panchayat and some bricks during the process of paving the village streets. The Enquiry Officer vide his report Annexure-P-2 found the petitioner guilty of these two charges and the Director of Panchayats on the basis of this report, passed the order (copy Annexure-P3) for removal of the petitioner from the Sarpanchship, besides disqualifying him for re-election for a period of five years. The proceedings under S.105 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 (hereinafter called the Act) were also ordered to be taken against the petitioner. The petitioner then went in appeal against the said order before the Deputy Commissioner, Jind, who dismissed the same on 15th Oct., 1985 (copy Annexure-P4). Thereafter, the petitioner resorted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, mainly on the ground that he having been exonerated in the first enquiry regarding the charge of embezzlement of proceeds of the Kikar trees, no second enquiry could be held against him. It was further contended that the Enquiry Officer had failed to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses in the right context about the handing over of the sale-proceeds of the Kikar trees to the petitioner and that the pavement of the streets being done under the supervision of Bhag Singh Panch as per the resolution of the Panchayat, he was not responsible for the alleged embezzlement of some bricks. It was also maintained that the report of the Vigilance Enquiry could not be relied upon by the Deputy Commissioner while rejecting his appeal as neither a copy of the report was supplied to him nor such report was put to him during the enquiry by the Enquiry Officer.
(2.) In return filed by the respondents, it was admitted that in the previous enquiry held by the Additional General Assistant, Jind, the petitioner was exonerated, but the said report having not been accepted by the competent authority, i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, Jind, the second enquiry regarding the same allegations was not barred. It was further maintained that Shri Bhag Singh Panch was appointed to supervise the work of pavement of the village streets with pacca bricks, but all the same the overall supervision of this work being of the Sarpanch, he was rightly held liable for the same. The rest of the allegations of the petitioner were denied.
(3.) I have heard Mr. S. C. Kapoor, Advocate, assisted by Mr. Naresh Katiyal, Advocate, for the petitioner as well as Mr. S. S. Ahlawat, learned Deputy Advocate General, Haryana, for the respondents. There is no dispute regarding the legal position that under the provisions of S.102(2) of the Act, only one enquiry is contemplated and no second enquiry could be ordered if the first report of the Enquiry Officer had been accepted by the authority competent to impose punishment or exonerate the defaulter. The single Bench decisions of this Court in Sultan Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, 1971 PLJ 456 and in Mehar Singh v. The Director of Panchayats, Punjab, 1972 PLJ 353 can be safely referred in this regard. In the case in hand, there is no dispute between the parties that the Additional General Assistant, Jind did exonerate the petitioner in the first enquiry, but strange enough despite the specific averment of the petitioner that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner accepting or rejecting the enquiry is not being supplied to him, the respondents had not taken any step to place copy of that order on the file but felt contented by generally alleging that the competent authority was not bound to accept the report of the Enquiry Officer and second enquiry could be ordered. Under these circumstances, there is no option but to conclude that the order of the Deputy Commissioner on the first enquiry report had been withheld by the respondents because if produced it might have gone against their case. Thus an adverse presumption has to be drawn against the respondents to the effect that the Deputy Commissioner, Jind had accepted the first report of the Additional General Assistant, Jind. So the second enquiry ordered by the Director of Panchayats regarding the charge of embezzlement of the proceeds of the Kikar trees by the petitioner being against the provisions of S.102 of the Act is certainly liable to be quashed.