ZILE SINGH Vs. MUNSHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS judgment will dispose of Regular Second Appeals Nos. 591, 1771, 1854, 1928, 1929, 1930 and 1931 of 1984 as common questions of fact and law are involved in these appeals. I would refer to the facts emerging out of the pleadings of the parties giving rise to RSA No. 591 of 1984. Reference to the parties in the body of the judgment will be the same as stated in the plant.

(2.) THE plaintiffs were the tenants on the suit land. Respondents-defendants filed an application under Section 14a (i) of the Pubjab Security of land Tenures Act, 1953 for their ejectment. The appplication was allowed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Gohana vide order dated 24th September 1966 ordering their ejectment. The order was to be implemented only after settling on the plaintiffs some surplus land. The plaintiffs claim that they remained in possession of the land even after the ejectment order was passed against them and their possession is adverse to the true owners and they acquired ownership rights on the suit land by adverse possession. They also prayed for prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering in their possession. The defendants-landlords denied the allegations made in the plaint, On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the suit land and have become owners of the same by way of adverse possession? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs were allotted land from me surplus area in lieu of the suit land as alleged and whether the defendants are in possession of the suit land since that time? OPD.

(3.) RELIEF. The trial Court disposed of issues Nos. 1 and 2 by a common finding. It was held that after the ejectment order, the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession of the suit land and the plea of the defendants that they were delivered possession after the plaintiffs were re-settled on the surplus land was not accepted as correct. The trial Court found that the revenue entries indicate that the plaintiffs remained in possession of the suit land till the filing of the suit. Before the first appellate Court, the only point urged was that the defendants were in possession and the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit land and that they have not acquired the ownership rights by way of adverse possession. The learned first appellate Court on appraisal of oral as well as documentary evidence found that the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession of the suit land even after passing of the ejectment order against them. After the ejectment order was passed, the relationship of landlord and tenant came to an end and the plaintiffs lost their right to remain in possession of the land and their possession became adverse to the true owners from that date onwards and they had perfected their title by adverse possession. The defendants-landlords have come up in second appeal in this Court. 3-4. The learned counsel for the defendants-landlords has raised the following submission, namely, that after the ejectment order was passed against the plaintiffs-tenants, they remained in possession of the land as tenants at sufferance and they must first surrender the possession of the land to the landlords and thereafter re-enter on the land and they will be deemed to be in adverse possession from the date of re-entry and not from the date of passing of the ejectment order. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied upon the following authorities: (i) Daulat Ram and Nepal Singh v. Payare Lal and Bhagwan Sahai, 1975 Pun LJ 12; (ii) Badrilal v. Municipal Corpn. of Indore, AIR 1973 SC 508. In Daulat Ram and Nepal Singh's case (supra), the facts are as under: Daulat Ram (appellant) and another filed a suit for possession against Pyare Lal and another on the grounds of ownership pleading that defendants (respondents) were in cultivating possession of the suit land for the last two years. They were asked to discontinue the cultivation but they refused to do so which necessitated the filing of a suit. The defendants took the pleas that they have become the owners by adverse possession and that they were tenants on the suit land and therefore, could not be evicted. The trial Court held that the defendants had not perfected their title to the land by adverse possession, that the defendants were the tenants and that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial Court directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation in the revenue Court. On appeal, the first appellate Court found that the defendants were not in adverse possession. However, it was held that the defendants were not the tenants on the suit land and that the civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and consequently, it passed a decree for possession against the defendants. The defendants came up in second appeal before this Court. Their appeal was allowed by a single Judge who set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and restored that of the trial Court. Letters Patent Appeal was preferred against the judgment of the learned single Judge. Mahajan, J. (as his Lordship then was) held that once it is proved that relationship of landlord and the tenant existed between the parties and thereafter tenant ceased to pay the rent, that relationship is not put to an end. C. G. Suri, J. (as his Lordship then was) recorded a contrary note and ultimately the matter was referred to B. R. Tuli, J. (as his Lordship then was) on difference of opinion between D. K. Mahajan and C. G. Suri JJ. B. R. Tuli, J. agreed with the conclusion arrived at by Mahajan, J. but disagreed with that of C. G. Suri, J. and resultantly the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed upholding the judgment of the learned single Judge. This ruling has not even the remotest applicability to the facts of the instant case and is not an authority for the proposition canvassed at the bar. In the case in hand, the plaintiffs never pleaded that they remained in possession of the suit land as tenants after the ejectment order was passed against them. To the contrary, they have specifically pleaded that their possession was adverse to the true owner from the date the eviction order was passed against them. 5. Adverting to the facts of Badrilal's case (AIR 1973 SC 508) (supra), the position in that case was as under: Badrilal appellant before the apex Court had obtained a plot of land measuring 10,375 sq. feet on lease for a period of 10 years in 1919. The lease was renewed from time to time and the last renewal was in the year 1939 for a period of 10 years. The lease was to expire on 30th September, 1949. On 24th May 1949 the Municipal Corporation issued a notice to the appellant to vacate the land by 30th September, 1949. The lessee applied to the Municipal Commissioner either to grant him a lease for 99 years or to renew it for a period of 10 years more. On 19th December,1949 the Municipal Council passed a resolution that the iand be given on lease to the appellant only if he is ready to deposit Rs. 16,212/- as lease rent and upset price as per Schedule rate in accordance with letter dated October 26, 1949 issued by the Municipal Commissioner. The lessee did not comply with this order and wanted to pay the lease money in instalments. The Municipal Corporation filed a suit for possession against the appellant (lessee ). The trial Court and the first appellate Court held that the appellant was tenant holding over. The High Court upset the judgments of the Courts below and decreed the claim of the Corporation. Before the apex Court, the only question for determination was, whether the appellant was lessee holding over. The apex Court found that the appellant was merely a tenant at sufferance and no notice was required to be issued to him before he could be evicted. The apex Court laid down the distinction between the tenant continuing in possession after termination of lease with the consent of the landlord and the tenant doing so without his consent. In the former case, he becomes a tenant holding over and in the letter's case a tenant at sufferance and could be evicted without prior notice. The question which is being urged by the learned counsel was not before the apex Court and the ruling is not an authority for the proposition propounded. On the contrary, the apex Court settled that the tenant at sufferance need not be served by any notice before eviction. 6. The difference between the tenancy-at-will and the tenancy at sufferance is that in the one case the tenant holds by right and has an estate or term in the land, precarious though it may be, and the relationship of the lessor and the lessee subsists between the parties; in the other, the tenant holds wrongfully and against the will and permission of the landlord, and has no estate at all in the occupied premises. A tenant at sufferance comes in by right and holds over without right. He stands very nearly on the same footing as a trespasser and he has no term and no estate or title. He is merely in occupancy without right and wrongfully. 7. Article 139 of the Limitation Act 1908 equivalent to Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides a period of 12 years for filing a suit for possession by the landlord against a tenant who continues to remain in possession of the land after determination of the lease. The lease was determined after the eviction order was passed. The tenants continued to remain in possession thereafter as found by the Courts below which is a finding of fact and not open to challenge, in second appeal. Even otherwise, this finding was not assailed by the learned counsel for the defendants for the reason that his clients were in possession although the finding recorded by the Courts below is to the contrary. In the instant case, the defendant-landlords did not file a suit for possession within a period of 12 years from the date of eviction order. Thus, their right to recover possession of the land has been lost by lapse of time. The landlords' right may be subsisting but remedy has been lost. They cannot have the legal recourse to recover the possession. 8. For the foregoing reason, these appeals have no merit and the same are dismissed. No costs. 9. Appeals dismissed.