LAWS(P&H)-1979-4-16

GURBACHAN SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

Decided On April 06, 1979
GURBACHAN SINGH Appellant
V/S
STATE OF PUNJAB Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this writ petition, the vires of Section 3 of the Punjab Cycle-Rickshaw (Regulation of Licence) Act 41 of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), has been challenged being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as cycle-rickshaw owners who used to give their cycle- rickshaws on hire for being plied by the hirers have been denied the right of carrying on their trade. and business and to earn their livelihood.

(2.) The six petitioners owned about 26 cycle-rickshaws for which they held licences for plying till 1976-77 and they used to give their cycle-rickshaws on hire for being plied by the hirers. The Act has been brought in force with effect from November 2, 1976, by the notification issued by the Punjab Government. The licences had to be renewed with effect from April 1, 1977, for the period ending March, 31 of the following year. The petitioners allege that their licences for the year 1976-77 have come to an end or stood revoked on the expiry of thirty clays of the enforcement of the Act although the same were valid up to March 31, 1977. Under the impugned Act, they are not entitled either to have their licences renewed or to apply for fresh licences and, therefore, they are totally excluded from carrying on the trade and business of giving their cycle- rickshaws on hire and in this manner their trade and business has been completely stopped, which is not permissible under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

(3.) The challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution is that under the Act some specified categories of persons are allowed to ply cycle-rickshaws whereas the petitioners are not allowed to own and run the cycle-rickshaws on hire which they were doing before the Act came into force and hence there is deprivation of equal protection guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. We are not impressed with this argument as the Act has made reasonable classification. The classification is between cycle-rickshaw owners who want to ply the rickshaws themselves and those who just want to own and get them plied on hire through others. We are of the opinion that this is a reasonable classification and if there was any discrimination within the same class, then it could be said that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. All rickshaw owners who want to ply themselves have been allowed to take licences for the rickshaws they own and which they want to ply. Similarly, each of the petitioners can get a licence for his rickshaw which he wants to ply himself. Hence within the same class there is no discrimination and we repel the contention of the learned counsel.