GURDWARA SAHIB PADSHAHI DASWIN TITTARSAR Vs. KESAR SINGH CHELA TIRATH SINGH OF GURDWARA SAHIB TITTARSAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The sole question which calls for consideration by the Full Bench in the present appeal is the scope and ambit of S. 87(1)(a) and (b) of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 (hereinafter called the Act), which is reproducd below:

(2.) Before embarking upon the interpretation of this provision. the facts and the background of the case may, briefly, be narrated. A suit under S. 28 of the Act, for the possession of the Gurdwara Sahib Padshahi Daswin (hereinafter called the Gurdwara) and agricultural land specified in the plaint, was filed by a Committee of management on behalf of the Gurdwara. According to the averments in the plaint, the Gurdwara was a notified Sikh Gurdwara under the Act and a Committee of management for the same had been nominated and notified in the Government Gazette dated April 12 1963. The said Committee by a resolution dated May 6, 1963, authorised its President and the Vice-President, Bharpur Singh and Bhura Singh, respectively, to institute the suit. This suit was contested by Mahant Kesar Singh defendent (now respondent), and a number of contentions regarding the limitation, valuation for the purpose of Court fee and the jurisdiction etc. were raised, which are not relevant for the purpose of the present controversy. The relevant contention was that the plaintiff Committee was not entitled to sue. This formed the basis of issue No. 5. On this issue, evidence was led by both the sides. The District Judge, Bhatinda, who tried the suit, arrived at the conclusion that the Committee of management through which the suit had been filed, had been constituted not only for the Gurdwara,, but for two Gurdwaras, namely, the Gurdwara, in question, and the Gurdwara Naumi Padshahi Maisar Khana and that the annual gross income of the two Gurdwaras having the same Committee of management was far in excess of Rupees 3,000/-. Consequently, it was held that the constitution of the Committee was invalid inasmuch as the same had been nominated under subclause (a) to sub-section (1) to S. 87 of the Act, whereas it ought to have been elected-cum-nominated as provided under sub-clause (b) to sub-section (1) to S. 87. In view of this finding, it was held that the plaintiff Committee had no locus standi to file the suit and the same was dismissed. This was challenged through appeal vide Regular First Appeal No. 165 of 1966. Goyal, J., vide his order dated March 7, 1977, agreed with the finding and the interpretation of the relevant Provisions of the Act by the learned District Judge and was of the opinion that the decision in R. F. A. No. 374 of 1965 (Jalaur Singh v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar) decided on Oct. 28, 1975 (Punj), interpreting S. 87(1)(a), of the Act to the following effect, required reconsideration by a larger Bench:

(3.) The appeal was then referred to the Division Bench comprising of Gurnam Singh, J., and myself. After hearing the learned counsel on both sides, vide our order dated July 19, 1977, we were of the view that the matter, in controversy, was important enough to be considered by a still larger Bench. It was in these circumstances that the case has been referred to the Full Bench.