PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD Vs. GIRDHARI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This order will dispose of two Civil Revision Nos. 1172 and 1422 of 1978. For the purpose of this order, the facts in Civil Revision No. 1172 of 1978 have been noticed.

(2.) An application was filed by the respondent for fixation of fair rent under Section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act before Rent Controller, Bhatinda. The building is, admittedly owned by the Punjab State Electricity Board (hereinafter called the Board) who opposed the application and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. During the pendency of these proceedings, the Board moved an application for amendment of the written statement so as to take the plea that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter as the respondent was an unauthorised occupant of the premises in dispute. This application has been rejected by the Rent Controller vide order dated April 1, 1978 solely on the ground that neither in the written statement no in the proposed amendment there was any averment that the premises in dispute were public premises. No doubt, in the proposed amendment, the word 'public' was missing but in the application which was moved for the amendment it has been clearly mentioned that the premises were public premises. The trial Court, therefore, acted illegally in refusing the permission simply on the ground that the word, 'public' was not mentioned in the proposed amendment by taking too technical a view of the averment made in the application.

(3.) The learned counsel for the respondent, however, urged that this Court his no jurisdiction to interfere with the order refusing the amendment as held by Tewatia, J. in Surinder Kumar and another v. Raj Kumar Sehgal and others, 1978 80 PunLR 472. A close reading of this decision would show that all that has been held in this decision is that apart from the three requirements of Sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has to be further shown to enable the Court to interfere with the impugned order that if it had been passed in favour of the petitioner it would have put an end to the suit or the proceedings or is not interfered with by the High Court would result in an irreparable loss to the petitioner or result in miscarriage of justice. The impugned order if not set aside would obviously lead to miscarriage of justice because the plea open to the respondent would be shut out. This decision, therefore, has no application to the facts of this case.