(1.) This will dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 7140 and 7141 of 1975, as similar questions arise in both of them.
(2.) Devi Sahai respondent No. 4 in Civil Writ Petition No. 7140 and Rama Nand who is respondent No. 4 in the other petition are related as brothers. In the year 1955 Devi Sahai effected a transfer of half-share in his land in favour of his adopted son Dharam Vir. Similarly, Rama Nand transferred 4/5th share of the land held by him in favour of his own sons who are the petitioners in petition No. 7141. Dharam Vir is the petitioner in the other petition. By two separate orders of the same date, namely, August 27, 1960, the Special Collector declared some area held by Devi Sahai and Rama Nand to be surplus. In the year 1974 notices under Section 24-A(2) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, were issued for the separation of surplus and permissible areas and at that stage the transferees raised this objection that they being the owners of the property no part of the land could be declared as surplus. Appeals by the respective petitioners were filed before the Commissioner, Ambala Division against the orders dated August 27, 1960, of the Special Collector. He dismissed the claims as being time-barred by his order dates September 18, 1974. The petitioners then filed separate revision petitions before the Financial Commissioner who by separate orders dated September 10, 1975, dismissed them. The merits of the claim of the petitioners were not gone into by any of these authorities.
(3.) The sole contention on behalf of the petitioners is that under Rule 6 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules an opportunity was required to be given by the Collector to hear their objections and that no such opportunity having ever been given to them any order passed against their tights is void. In this behalf Ankauri and another v. Financial Commissioner and others, 1971 RajdhaniLR 169, has been cited. It has been held therein that it was essential for the Special Collector to have afforded an opportunity of hearing to a transferee and this having not been done, the impugned order could not be sustained. In both these petitions a reference was made to the mutations about the transfer. These mutations had taken place in the year 1955 and thus the Revenue authorities, if they so willed, could have known to whom the land had been transferred. It has been laid down in Vir Singh v. The State of Punjab and others,1970 PunLJ 70, that the combined reading of sub-rules (6), (7) and (8) of the Rule of 6 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules 1956, clearly indicates that the limitation is to start from the date of the communication of the decision. An imperative duty is said to be cast on the Collector or the Special Collector to prepare a statement in form 'F' and forward it immediately for service on the landowner or the tenant. It is such a case that the order with regard to the declaration of the land as surplus was never communicated to the transferees. Rule 6 of the Rules mentioned above speaks of giving a notice to the landowner or the tenant and the word 'landowner' has been so interpreted in Smt. Ankauri's case as to mean even a transferee from the original landowner. The argument has been noted by the learned Financial Commissioner in para 2 of his order that it had been contended that limitation was to start from the date of the communication of the decision in relation to the surplus area. No finding in relation to the argument is, however, contained in the order. The legal position as appearing from the authorities cited above is not being contested by the learned counsel for the respondents and hence there is hardly any other course open to this Court but to quash the three impugned orders of the Special Collector, Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner in each of the cases. These writ petitions are allowed and all these orders are quashed. This order, however, would not debar the appropriate authority from re-determining the surplus area of the landowner or of the petitioners in accordance with law. In the circumstances of this case there shall be no order as to costs.