LAWS(P&H)-1979-4-15

GULZAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

Decided On April 30, 1979
GULZAR SINGH Appellant
V/S
STATE OF PUNJAB Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS judgment will dispose of Criminal Writ Petitions Nos. 25 and 28 of 1979, as the facts in both the cases are quite parallel and the point involved is also the same.

(2.) FOR the purpose of this judgment, the facts in Criminal Writ Petition No. 25 of 1979 shall be noticed. It is undisputed that the petitioner along with twelve others was convicted under Sections 302/149, 326/149 and 148, I. P. C. by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepore, who sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment for these offences. The material part of the sentence is the one imposed upon them under Sections. 302/149, I. P. C. i. e. , imprisonment for life. It is also a matter of record and, in fact, this allegation is contained in the petition itself that the petitioner filed an appeal in this Court against his aforesaid conviction and sentence, which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court. The age of the petitioner in this petition as also in the connected Writ Petition, was mentioned during their trial as sixteen years. The question as to whether they ought to have been dealt with under the provisions of the East Punjab Children Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was, however, not agitated, nor gone into either at the trial or at the appellate stage. The petitioner was, therefore, housed in Borstal Jail at Faridkot, where he is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life.

(3.) THE present petition has been launched by the petitioner with the base that by virtue of the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, he could not be detained in prison after attaining the age of eighteen years. The contention is that if the age of the petitioner is deemed to be sixteen years at the time of the trial, having undergone, by now more then four years of imprisonment, he is deemed to have crossed the age of eighteen years and, hence, entitled to the benefit under the aforesaid provision of the Act. When the Writ Petition was heard at the motion stage, it was thought expedient that the same should be considered by a Division Bench, in view of the fact that the conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner had been upheld in appeal by a Division Bench of this Court. This is how the two Writ Petitions have been placed before us for consideration.