STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. MESSRS SWADESHI KARYALA, LUDHIANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal has arisen in the following circumstances. Messrs Swadeshi Karyala, Ludhiana (hereinafter referred to as the Karyala submitted to the erstwhile State known as Pepsu a tender against which the said State placed with the Karyala an order for the supply of certain goods to the Inspector -General of Police, Patiala within two months of the date of the order which was conveyed under a letter dated the 20th of September, 1955. Although the order was placed within the period up to the end of which the tender was operative, the Karyala expressed its inability to execute the order on the plea that it had already sold out its stocks. The supply of the goods was, however, urgently required by the Government and they invited fresh tenders, one of which was accepted at rates higher than those quoted by the Karyala and an amount of Rs. 2,103.75 P. being the excess paid by the State in consequence was claimed by it from the Karyala according to the terms on which the tenders had originally been invited and submitted.

(2.) WHETHER the award is liable to be set aside on the grounds mentioned in paragraph 3 of the objection petition ? O.P.A.

(3.) SHRI Chhibbar then contended that even if no appeal lay, the appeal filed on behalf of the Punjab State should be treated as a petition for revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and heard on merits. To this submission Shri Bhandari had no objection except that the appeal could be heard as a revision only if the lower appellate Court could be held to have acted in one of the manners covered by clauses (a) (b) and (c) of the said section 115. Shri Chhibbar agreed that an appellate Court's order could be revised only in the cases envisaged in that section. He urged however, that by holding that there was no written agreement between the parties to refer their disputes to arbitration the lower appellate Court had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law inasmuch as the letter dated the 7th of December, 1959, requesting the Government to submit the case for arbitration to any officer appointed by it, when coupled with the acceptance of the request by the Government, amounted to a written agreement. He has cited certain authorities in order to show that the letter would, in the circumstances, be covered by the definition of "arbitration agreement" occurring in clause (a) of section 2 of the Arbitration Act. Whether that is so or not, however, I do not see how the case would fall within the ambit of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As laid down in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1336 section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not directed against conclusions of law or fact in which questions of jurisdiction are not involved. It has been often pointed out that when a Court decides a question of law erroneously, it cannot be said that it does so without jurisdiction.