BHARAT SINGH Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE notification under Section 4 read with Section 17 (2) (c) of the Land acquisition Act (1 of 1894) (hereinafter called the Act) issued by the Governor of haryana on January 2, 1969, and the notification issued by the same authority on the same day under Section and read with Section 17 (2) of the Act (collectively marked 'a') have been impugned in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution on the solitary ground that the State Government had no jurisdiction to invoke Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act for the public purpose of construction of the newly proposed District Jail, Rohtak as the said purpose cannot be read ejusdem generis with the purposes mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of that section. The abovesaid proposition urged by the petitioners was sought to be supported by the following observations of a division Bench of this Court (D. K. Mahajan and Shamsher Bahadur, JJ.) in Murari lal Gupta v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 Punj 477:-

(2.) IT has been recently held by a Full Bench of this Court (D. K. Mahajan and shamsher Bahadur, JJ. and myself) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 20 of 1966, printers House (P) Ltd. , New Delhi v. Misri Lal, decided on April 18, 1969 (Punj FB)that the principle of ejusdem generis does not apply to Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act, and that observations to the contrary in Murari Lal gupta's case AIR 1964 Punj 477 do not lay down the correct law. It has been held by the Full Bench that each of the three classes forms a separate class by itself and the different classes of urgency named in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 17 (2) form an independent genus by themselves and are not mere species of one common genus, in this view of the matter, the main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners fails.

(3.) THIS leaves me with only two questions. The first is whether on the facts, admitted or proved, in this case, it can be said that the declaration of urgency in respect of the land required for the construction of a new jail at Rohtak has been made without the State Government applying its mind to the matter or whether the urgency provision has been invoked merely as a colourable transaction. In paragraph 5 of the return of the State, it has been averred that the existing jail building at Rohtak is in a dilapidated condition, that part of it has already come down, that the accommodation is altogether insufficient and there is no scope for its expansion under the existing conditions. It has then been added in Clause (a)of paragraph 7 that the notifications were issued by the Government after a careful consideration of the whole matter and that the land is needed urgently as the jail which is necessary to house the offenders sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with law, is directly linked with the law and order of the country, and, therefore, the matter was really of urgent importance, and it could not brook any delay. As settled by the Supreme Court in Raja Anand Brahma Shah's case, AIR 1967 SC 1081 this Court cannot substitute its own opinion for the subjective opinion of the State Government. On the material placed on the record of this case, I am satisfied that it is impossible to say that the State Government has not applied its mind to the question of urgency or that the urgency provision has been invoked mala fide.