(1.) TWO Letters Patent appeals. The Printers House (Private) Limited v. Misri Lal etc. (L. P. A. No. 20 of 1966) and State of Punjab v. Misri Lal etc. (L. P. A. No. 29 of 1966) arising out of the same judgment of Grover J. of 28th October, 1965 in misri Lal v. Punjab State, (R. S. A. No. 1536 of 1964) referred to a Full Bench by the order of the Division Bench of Chief Justice Mehar Singh and Harbans Singh J. of 25th April, 1967, would be disposed of by this judgment. The question of law which has arisen in these appeals is common to Civil Writ No. 917 of 1967 which in consequence of the referring order of Mahajan J. of 28th November, 1967, is also before us. Mahajan J. directed this writ petition to be heard along with the letters patent appeals, the question of law being the same. As this writ petition will have to be decided on its own facts, it would go before a learned Single Judge for disposal in accordance with the decision of this Full Bench on the legal questions. The direction which is being given towards the close of this judgment with regard to this writ petition is that it should be listed for hearing next week before a learned Single Judge.
(2.) IT would be necessary to reiterate the facts set out in detail both by the learned single Judge in the judgment under appeal and Harbans Singh J. in the referring order as it is eventually on these that the decision would turn after the Full Bench has formulated its opinion on the questions of law referred to it.
(3.) LAND measuring 113 Kanals and 17 Marias in village Ranhera in Ballabgarh tehsil, out of which an area of 12 Kanals and 1 Maria is in possession of the respondent Misri Lal for carrying on the business of running an electric wooden saw mill and chaff-cutting machine, came to be acquired by two notifications issued by the State of Punjab on 28th March, 1961, the first under Section 4 of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) and the second under the provisions of Section 17. It is interesting to observe in retrospect that the object of urgency has been frustrated altogether by a resort to the special provisions of section 17, the validity of which has been the primary concern of the litigation giving rise to these Letters Patent appeals. The case is not a solitary illustration of its kind and might usefully provide the State Government with an object lesson that acquisition of land for public purposes can be effectuated more speedily by taking the ordinary recourse of notification under Section 4, instead of coupling it with a simultaneous notification under Sec. 17 --a procedure which not infrequently generates discussion and controversy. The only advantage to be gained by invoking the urgency provisions of Section 17 of the Act is to get over the time-consuming process of hearing objections to acquisition under Section 5-A and in many cases one is left to wonder whether out of the two choices the hearing of objections would not in the long run have been a process involving a shorter period which elapses between the issue of intention (sic: impugned) notification under Section 4 and the actual possession of the land to be acquired.