HARDYAL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS first appeal from order has come before us on a reference made by my Lord the Chief Justice. The two question? of law which require decision, are as follows:

(2.) THE facts which led to the reference are not in dispute and may be stated in a narrow compass. Hardyal Appellant entered on 4th January, 1958 into a contract with the State of Punjab, Public Works Department, Buildings and Roads Branch, for the construction of some bridges and culverts on the Mukerian -Naushehra road. In the written agreement between the parties there was an arbitration clause which provided that the disputes, if any, would be referred for arbitration to the Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, (Buildings and Roads), Jullundur Circle, who would be the sole arbitrator. Some disputes did arise as a result whereof the Appellant sent a notice, Exhibit C 2, on 7th January, 1960, to the Superintending Engineering calling upon him to accept his claim to the tune of Rs. 7,568 and give his award accordingly. It is not necessary to make a mention of the details of his claim and suffice to state that the Appellant claimed this amount as compensation because of the Sub -Divisional Officer having not demolished certain bridge which according to the Appellant had been constructed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Since the Appellant had also been directed to stop his work the total claim for compensation, including that for demolition of the bridge, as made by him was for the said amount. The proceedings commenced before the arbitrator and the first date of hearing was 20th February, 1961. It is not disputed that both the parties continued taking part in the proceedings which ultimately ended in the impugned award dated 28th April, 1961. The claim of the Appellant was rejected in toto by the arbitrator. The Appellant then presented an application on 1st June, 1961, in the court of Senior Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur, raising certain objections under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called the Act), and prayed that the award made by the Superintending Engineer on 28th April, 1961, be set aside. The objections raised were:

(3.) THE policy of law has always been that awards are given as expeditiously as possible and in furtherance of this policy it is provided, by the Act that time cannot be extended by the parties or ever, by the arbitrators and it is the Court which must apply its mind and agree to the extension of time. If a Court finds that the making of the award is being unnecessarily delayed whether for any fault of the arbitrators or the parties, it can exercise its discretion and supersede the arbitration altogether thereby leaving it to the parties to have recourse to proceedings by way of a regular suit. It is not correct to say that the parties, by mutual consent whether expressed in writing or given orally, when the arbitrators are seized of the proceedings can have the time enlarged without the intervention of the Court. There is one and only one eventuality as referred to in Sub -section (2) of Section 28, which is in the nature of a proviso to that section when the arbitrators or umpire can enlarge the time with the consent of the parties to the agreement and that is where a provision to that effect appears in the arbitration agreement.