SURJA Vs. CHHOTTO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The sale was by a female of property inherited by her from her husband, and it was pre-empted by the co-sharers, whose claim has failed throughout because it has been found that a co-sharer can only succeed under sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913), if his claim falls under clauses (b) and (c) of that sub-section, and that he has no right of pre-emption if the sale is by a female of property inherited by her from her husband, because such a right is given to persons specifically mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act.

(2.) The learned Single Judge in support of his conclusion relied upon Debi Ram v. Chambeli,1963 PunLR 500, Santa Singh v. Hazara Singh,1965 PunLR 132, and Surjit Singh v. Nazir Singh, 1965 67 PunLR 1108, in all of which cases the learned Judges considered alienations by females coming within the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act and held that an alienation coming under that sub-section excluded a right of pre-emption to those who did not come under the same but only came under sub-section (1) of Section 15. In each case the learned Judge considered the opening words of sub-section (2) in these terms "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)" and came to the conclusion that those words excluded the application of sub-section (1) to cases to which sub-section (2) of Section 15 applies. So in this view the learned Single Judge upheld the judgment and decree of the Courts below.

(3.) In this appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent it is urged by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the co-sharers that the words 'Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)' in the beginning of sub-section (2) of Section 15 should be read to mean that first the right of pre-emption of the persons mentioned in sub-section (1) will prevail and it is only when there is no such person in a position to exercise such a right that the operation of sub-section (2) comes in. The argument is basically wrong because the words referred to above give a right of pre-emption to those mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 qua sale by a female 'Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) 'of that very Section, which obviously means, as held by the learned Judges in the three cases already cited, that the right given to the persons mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 prevails over those mentioned in sub-section (1) of that Section. In this approach, this appeal fails and is dismissed, but there is no order in regard to costs. I agree.