JAGIR SINGH SOBHA SINGH Vs. SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER PEPSU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN writ petition Uttam Singh v. State of Pepsu- (Civil Misc. No. 83/p of 1955), originally filed in the Pepsu High Court, two questions of law raised before the learned Single Judge and referred by him to us for decision are expressed thus - -. (1) Whether the powers conferred by Section 41 of the Pepsu Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act No. V of 2007 Bk. upon the Government can be exercised by the Government alone or by the authority to whom such power is delegated by Government under section 42 and not by the Revenue Minister?

(2.) WHETHER the Revenue Minister acting under Section 41 of the Act is a tribunal or was exercising powers under Section 41 on the executive side alone? The same two questions arose in a similar petition, Ram Kishan dass v. State of Pepsu and others (Civil Misc. No. 183/p of 1955), which came up before one of us sitting alone, and the questions referred are stated as follows : -

(3.) REGARDING the first two questions the main argument is that whenever the State government exercised its powers under Section 41 of Pepsu Act V of 2007 Bk. , it was exercising a quasi-judicial function, and, therefore, the Minister in charge of the Department of Consolidation was not authorised merely by virtue of the business Rules made under Article 166 of the Constitution to decide such a matter, and his decision did not become the decision of the State Government. This has now been authoritatively answered by the Supreme Court in Gulla Palli Nageswara rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Petn. No. 100 of 1958 d/- 5-11-1958 : (AIR 1959 SC 308 ). The question in that case related to the exercise of certain powers by the State Government under the Motor Vehicles Act. It was contended in that case that the State Government, when considering and disposing of certain objections filed against a scheme, was acting in a quasi- judicial capacity. The Supreme Court agreed. It was on that basis contended that the objections being actually disposed of by the Secretary in charge of the transport Department, his decision was not the decision of the State Government. The Supreme Court went into the Rules of Business which were in essential particulars identical to the Rules of Business framed by the Pepsu Government, and found that those rules framed under Article 166 of the Constitution did authorise the officer named in the Rules to exercise the powers of the State government. The objection taken then was that the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution could govern the transaction of merely executive business of the Government and could not relate to the discharge of quasi-judicial functions. Answering this objection the Supreme Court observed :--