LAWS(P&H)-1949-11-7

HARNAM SINGH Vs. CROWN

Decided On November 29, 1949
HARNAM SINGH Appellant
V/S
CROWN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) FIVE persons, Harnam Singh who is alleged to be seventy years of age and his four sons, two of whom are named Frangi Singh and Janga Singh of Dhindsa, were being prosecuted for an offence alleged to be dacoity in regard to the wheat belonging to Baldev Parshad of Kangar or his tenants. It is alleged that this offence was committed on or about 24th August 1947 and the first information report was made on 31st October 1947, and accused persons were released on bail.

(2.) FOR some reason or another the case was not heard for about a year and a half and after some hearings on 13th July 1949, a charge was framed under Section 395, Penal Code, by the learned Magistrate. It is stated by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that from July 1949 to 14th September 1949 there were six hearings in the case in the Court of the learned Magistrate. On 14th September 1949, two witnesses who were both Sub -Inspectors of Police had been called for their cross -examination, but they did not appear and it is the case of the accused that the prosecution wanted that these witnesses should be given up but they were not agreeable to this course.

(3.) AFTER the hearing of the case was over, the Prosecuting Inspector, it appears, filed an application for the bail to be cancelled and although the case had been adjourned for the next hearing to 19th September 1919, a notice was issued for 15th September 1949; and this is one of the matters about which the accused complain. To my way of thinking there is nothing wrong in the learned Magistrate fixing the hearing of this matter for the following day. At any rate, the notice was given to the learned Advocate Mr. B. Rai who was appearing for the accused persons, and on that day Mr. B. Rai appeared along with Janga Singh who happened to be present in Ferozepur. The learned Magistrate ordered the cancellation of bail of all the accused and Janga Singh, who was then present, was sent to the judicial lock up. An application was made for stay of proceedings because the accused persons wanted to apply for transfer of the case under Section 526, Criminal Procedure Code, and a point has been made by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that in spite of this stay application, the learned Magistrate went on with the proceedings. The learned Magistrate in his explanation has stated that he stopped proceedings in the case, but he did not stop writing the order on the bail application (which he had started writing) which had been made by the accused persons. On that point also, I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned advocate that the learned Magistrate should have stopped writing which he had already begun. That is again a point of not very great significance.