STATE OF HARYANA Vs. BHOOP SINGH AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The award in challenge is a direction for reinstatement and back wages. The workman's contention was that he had been working from the year 1988 as a casual labour on daily wages in Public Health Department. His contention was that he was feeling unwell from 29.05.1993 and remained on sick leave for a couple of days and when he went to resume duty, the Sub Divisional Engineer refused to take him back. The management, however, contended that there was no termination at all. The workman had remained absent from 12.04.1993 on his own and since there was no termination, the workman cannot complain of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

(2.) Before the Labour Court, evidence had been tendered to the effect that the workman had worked for 169 days in 1988, 356 days in 1989, 303 days in 1990, 296 days in 1991, 242 days in 1992, and 181 days in 1993. The Labour Court had referred to the calendar years when what was appropriate was only a reference to 12 months prior to the date of alleged termination. The Labour Court, however, found even if the workman had remained absent, it was not open for the management to award extreme penalty of dismissal. The Labour Court purported to have drawn reliance upon D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Limited, 1993 LLR 585 and held that the termination of services of an employee without holding an enquiry was bad. At all times the contention of the management was that they had never terminated the workman but the workman had himself absented from April, 1993. The learned counsel Shri Nalwa would contend that without a finding whether the services had been terminated, there could not be an inference that there was a violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. He also points out that if the Labour Court had found that the workman had 181 days in 1993, he could not have found that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F.

(3.) I have no difficulty in finding that the Labour Court was not correct when it was considering the number of days of the service in every calendar year, when what was relevant was 12 months prior to the date of alleged termination. The question whether the workman did not have 240 days of service during the relevant period has not been specifically denied anywhere by the management. It is not even urged in the writ petition, although contended by the learned counsel before me that the workman had not completed 240 days during the relevant period of 12 months prior to the alleged termination. It shall, therefore, be impermissible for the management to contend that the workman did not have 240 days prior to his cessation of service with the management.