(1.) Reference to the basic facts would be necessary to determine the merit of the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties in this regular second appeal.
(2.) Pawan Kumar, respondent herein, instituted a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 4.6.1985 and for possession of the suit property. He contended that the agreement to sell was executed for a total consideration of Rs. 40,503/- at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per killa and a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was paid as earnest money. Subsequently, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was paid on 3.6.1986 and time for execution of the sale deed was extended to 3.6.1987 and thereafter again extended to 2.6.1988. Inspite of receipt of the aforestated amount, Arjan Singh did not turn up for execution of the sale deed, inspite of the notice, resulting in filing of the present suit and specific performance was prayed for with damages. The suit was contested by the defendants. He denied the execution of agreement dated 4.6.1985 and claimed that the agreement was the result of a fraud. The defendant contended that he used to sell the crops to the plaintiff and he stopped selling the crops and as a grudge on this account, the plaintiff has forged the agreement to sell. One agreement to sell was got executed from the wife of the plaintiff, for .which he has instituted the suit. Based on the pleadings of the parties aforestated, the learned trial court framed the following four is- sues:-
(3.) The learned trial court answered all the issues against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. Consequently, passed the decree for specific performance of the agreement and for possession and directed execution of the sale deed upon deposit of the balance sale consideration, which is stated to be Rs. 5,503/-. The judgment and decree of the learned trial court dated 22.7.1993 was assailed in regular first appeal, of course unsuccessfully. The first appeal preferred by the present appellant was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Kapurthala, vide judgment dated 3.1.1998, giving rise to the filing of the present regular second appeal. While impugning the judgment of the learned first appellate court, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the time was the essence of the contract and the respondent herein having failed to adhere to the time schedule was not entitled to the relief of specific performance. Secondly, he argued that the learned courts below have erred in appreciating the evidence and disbelieving the version put forward by the present appellant.