BRIJ MOHAN Vs. MADAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE present revision petition is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Ferozepur, dated 10. 4. 1995. By virtue of the impugned judgment the learned Additional District Judge had allowed the appeal filed by Madan Lal and instead dismissed the application filed by the respondent-plaintiff under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Needless to state that during the pendency of the petition Madan Lal who had been arrayed as respondent No. 1 died and his legal representatives had been impleaded.

(2.) THE relevant facts are that Brij Mohaff had filed a suit for specific performance against the respondent-defendant on the basis of alleged agreement to sell dated 12. 12. 1991. The agreement is purported to have been executed by Rattan Lal respondent No. 1 as general attorney of Nirmal Kumar, Surinder Kumar and M/s Raman Nand Manohar Lal for sale of properties consisting of 40 rooms situated in street Seth Raman Nand Wali, Ferozepur City. It was asserted that the first sale deed of 1/3 share of the disputed property was to be executed on or before 31. 1. 1992, the second sale deed of l/3rd share on 31. 12. 1992 and the third sale deed of l/3rd share to be completed on 30. 12. 1993. The respondent were stated to have failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreements which led to the filing of the suit for specific performance and possession. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner had filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents from alienating the suit property. The learned trial Court on 22. 4. 1994 had granted ex parte ad interim injunction restraining defendants No. 1 to 4 from alienating the property in favour of any person.

(3.) DEFENDANTS No. 2 to 4 filed their separate written statement. They contended that Rattan Lal had no authority to represent the firm. He had no authority to enter into an agreement. He was merely a Karinda having oral authority to collect the rent from various tenants. They alleged that the suit had been filed on false and vexatious allegations in collusion with defendant No. 1.