BALRAJ AHUJA Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is said to have owned an extent of 1317 Kanals 14 Marlas of land in three villages in Tahsil Muktsar, District Faridkot. This included a fruit garden measuring 328 Kanals 14 Marlas. A portion of this fruit garden is protected by a boundary wall constructed by the petitioner and there are a number of fruit bearing trees. The Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, (Punjab Act No. 10 of 1973) received the assent of the President on March 24, 1973, and came into force on its publication in the Punjab Government Gazette (Extraordinary) on April 2, 1973. The long title of the Act states that it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to ceiling on land holdings, acquisition of proprietary rights by tenants and other ancillary matters in the State of Punjab. Section 2 contains a declaration to the effect that the Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cls. (b) and (c) of Art.39 of the Constitution. The Act, among others, provided for vesting in the State Government all the surplus area as determined under the provisions of the Act. Section 10 of the Act provided for principles in accordance with which the amount payable for the land is to be determined by the Collector or authorised officer.

(2.) The writ petition in this case has questioned the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act authorising the declaration, utilization and taking possession of the land declared surplus without making any provision for payment of compensation for structural improvements, cemented khals, valuable standing timber, garden and crops and the amount provided for the land declared surplus and taken possession of under S.10 is illusory and the provisions are illegal, void and ultra vires the Art.300-A of the Constitution and the inherent right of the petitioner to be paid just compensation.

(3.) On an earlier occasion in Sucha Singh Bajwa v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 Punj and Har 162, a Full Bench of this Court had considered the constitutional validity of the Punjab Land Reforms Act No.10 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Specifically, the constitutional validity of S.4, S.5 and the definitions of the words "family" and "person" in S.3(4) and (10) were questioned in that case. S.4 fixed the ceiling on land which a person could own or hold as landowner or mortgagee with possession or tenant or partly in one capacity and partly in another. S.5 enabled a landowner, who is in possession of land in excess of the permissible area, to select the permissible area and give intimation to the authorised officer in this behalf. The Full Bench held that the Act is clearly a measure of agricultural reform and its provisions fall under Art.31-A of the Constitution as they relate to the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights as provided in sub-cl. (a) of cl.(1) of Art.31-A. They were also of the view that the various provisions of the Act in so far as the acquisition of surplus land and its distribution amongst the poorer and weaker sections of the society mentioned in S.11 of the Act are concerned, can also be justified under cls. (b) and (c) of Art.39 of the Constitution. In that view, they held that the Act is immune from attack on the ground that its provisions take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts.14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The contention as to the constitutional validity of Ss.4 and 5 of the Act was, therefore, rejected. However, they held that the definition of the word "person" in S.3(10) of the Act in so far as it includes "family" is unconstitutional with the result that in every provision of the Act, the word "person" wherever used shall not include "family". Certain other consequential provisions contained in the Act were also held as invalid on the basis of this portion of the judgment. The case went up in appeal to the Supreme Court in so far as it held that Ss.3(10) and 3(4) and the corresponding references in Ss.4(1) and 4(2) of the Act were held invalid. The Supreme Court considered the validity of these provisions along with some other cases arising from the State of Maharashtra in the decision reported as Dattatraya Govind v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 915. It may be mentioned that at the time when the Full Bench delivered the judgment, the Act was not included in the Ninth Schedule, but by the time it came up for consideration before the Supreme Court, it was included in the Ninth Schedule. Therefore, though at the time when the Full Bench delivered the judgment Article 31-B could not have been relied on, but in the decision of the Supreme Court, the immunity conferred under Art.31B also was relied on. The Supreme Court held that the provisions introducing the concept of a family unit and clubbing together lands held by each member of the family unit and applying the limitation of ceiling area in reference to the aggregation of such lands are not violative of the second proviso to cl. (1) of Art.31-A and even if they were, they are protected by Art.31-B and accordingly they upheld the provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, as they are not in conflict with the second proviso to cl. (1) of Art.31-A and in any event they are protected from invalidation under Art.31-B. The first portion of the relief to the effect that the provisions of the Act authorising declaration, utilization and taking possession of land declared as surplus does not, therefore, strictly arise for consideration. However, what is contended by the learned counsel is that S.10 of the Act, in effect, does not provide for payment of compensation for structural improvements, cemented khals, valuable standing timber, garden and crops and that therefore that provision is ultra vires of Art.300-A of the Constitution and the inherent right of the petitioner to be paid just compensation.