MASTER PARTAP SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE District Magistrate, Amritsar, passed an order under Section 3(2) read with section 3(3) of the National Security Act, 1980, against the petitioner, with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order. This order was passed by the District Magistrate conscious of the fact that the petitioner was already in judicial custody in cases registered against him and that in his view the petitioner was taking steps to get himself released from custody and there was every likelihood of his being set at liberty and in that event to indulge in prejudicial activities in view of his prima facie propensities towards such activities. It is in this manner that the compelling necessity to pass the detention order was recorded. The grounds of detention are framed as follows :

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner had nowhere even attempted to file bail applications in the cases mentioned in the grounds and thus the District Magistrate had no reason to come to the satisfaction that the petitioner was likely to be released on bail and resume his prejudicial activities. Reliance has been placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and others, AIR 1986 SC 315 and Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhandbad, Bihar and others, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 2090. Reliance has also been placed on two unreported Single Bench decisions of this Court in Crl. Writ No. 1467 of 1987 (Mohinder Singh v. The State of Punjab and another, 1988(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 485) decided on January 11, 1988 and Crl. Writ No. 1731 of 1987 (Chanchal Singh v. The State of Punjab and another) decided on January 8, 1988. In these cases the principle has been laid down and recognised that on the ground that an accused in detention as an under trial prisoner was likely to get bail, an order of detention under the National Security Act should ordinarily be not passed. On the strength of that principle, it is claimed that the order of detention is unsustainable.

(3.) IT has next been contended on behalf to the petitioner that the alleged utterance of the petitioner to police officers were in the nature of confessions made to them and were not admissible per se in evidence before Courts of law. This is a matter which should not detain me even for a moment, for the detaining authority had arrived at a subjective satisfaction, on the material laid before him and not merely on the alleged confessions. It cannot be said even for a moment that such material was not capable of being looked into by the detaining authority.