GURMUKH SINGH Vs. DIRECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition is directed against the order of Additional Director of Consolidation, Punjab, dated 10th October, 1978, annexure P-3.

(2.) The proceedings under Section 21(1) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), were completed in the village on 1st July, 1961. A petition under section 42 of the Act was filed on 15th September, 1978. An objection was taken that the same was not within time. The learned Additional Director heard the petition on the ground that the petitioner alleged that no path had been provided to his Tak and since he wanted a path along Northern side of Killa Nos. 64/12, 13 belonging to the petitioners in this petition, so the delay was condoned. On merits he found that "from the record it is apparent that no path is provided to the Tak of the petitioner and the only possible path which can be provided to him is along the Northern side of Killa Nos. 64/12, 13. The petitioner is prepared to give compensation to the respondents. The respondents do not agree to give the path on the ground that there are two paths already along his Tak but there appears to be no force in this contention because the path is got to be provided to the petitioner, otherwise it would not be possible for him to approach the land without the path".

(3.) At the time of motion hearing, on the basis of the Judgment of this Court in 1976 PLJ 317, it was contended that the limitation had been condoned on extraneous ground and consequently later on the petition was admitted. That ground of limitation is no more available to the petitioners and his also not been aruged. The only contention raised on behalf of the petitioners now is that the path provided by the Additional Director bisects the Kurrah and that being so it is against the scheme and secondly, respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 who filed the petition under section 42 of the Act before the Additional Director, were not the right-holders at the time or the repartition and, therefore, they had no right to maintain the petition under Section 42 of the Act. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that as a matter of fact, the path which was provided earlier and physically existed at the spot was closed subsequently by the petitioners and that is why necessity had arisen for filing the petition under Section 42 of the Act for providing the path. In any case, argued the learned counsel, there being no path, petition under section 42 of the Act was rightly maintained, and that no manifest injustice has been done to the respondents and, therefore, the petition was liable to be dismissed.