MANMOHAN SINGH Vs. CROMPTON GREAVES LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AN application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short 'the Act'), was filed on 20.9.1983 by Kuldip Singh and Associates and one Mohinder Singh as landlords (respondent Nos. 2 and 3) against Crompton Greaves Limited, respondent No. 1, in the Court of the learned Rent Controller, Jalandhar, on the ground that the tenant-respondent No. 1 had ceased to occupy the portion of the ground floor of the building described in the head-note of the application of which it was a tenant for a period of more than four months with effect from 1.1.1982. This ground of eviction falls within the mischief of clause (v) of Section 13(2) of the Act. When the eviction application was pending before the learned Rent Controller an application under Order 1, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, was filed by Manmohan Singh petitioner herein stating that he had purchased the property in dispute in which respondent No. 1 was a tenant from respondent Nos. 2 and 3 vide registered sale deed dated 17.7.1986. He prayed that he should be allowed to be brought on the record of the ejectment application as a petitioner in place of respondent No. 2 and 3. This application was, however, dismissed by the learned Rent Controller vide his order dated 16.9.1986 on the ground that the cause of action which had accrued to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for seeking ejectment of respondent No. 1 to the effect that it had ceased to occupy the premises in dispute did not survive on the sale of property by them to the petitioner. Aggrieved against this order, the petitioner has approached this Court through the present revision petition.

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel of the parties. I am of the considered view that learned Rent Controller seriously erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction by declining the application of the petitioner under Order 1, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure. Where a ground for eviction has become available to the previous landlord and he has not condoned the same and rather he has filed an eviction application seeking ejectment of the tenant on that ground which is pending when the transfer of property takes place, it can, in no circumstances, be said that the cause of action has ceased to exist. It would have been a different matter if the previous landlord in spite of his knowledge of the fact that the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for a period of four months condoned this fault of the tenant and allowed him to continue in the premises. That is certainly not the position here. Ejectment application against respondent No. 1 filed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is pending. The petitioner ought to have been allowed to step into their shoes and prosecute the ejectment application to its logical end. The cause of action certainly survived and was available to the petitioner.