BHAGWAN SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER Bhagwan Singh, who is confined in Central Jail, Amritsar, was sentenced to imprisonment for life by Sessions Judge, Amritsar, on 18-11-1982. He has moved this petition for his temporary release on furlough under section 4 of the Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 contending that he has undergone actual sentence of about 6 years excluding., remissions and that his conduct in jail has been satisfactory. According to him, his case for release on furlough was recommended by Jail Superintendent on 23-4-1986 and the same was rejected wrongly by the Inspector General of Prisons Punjab on 16-10-1986.

(2.) FROM the return filed on behalf of the respondents, it is clear that conduct of the petitioner while in jail was satisfactory. It is also not disputed that petitioner Bhagwan Singh qualifies for consideration for release on furlough. It is further added that furlough case of the petitioner was rejected by Inspector General of Prisons Punjab, Chandigarh, on 13-10-1986 on the basis of the reports made by the local police, Senior Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate, Amritsar. Under the above said Act, Government is permitted to act in consultation with District Magistrate alone. Report of the District Magistrate is incorporated in the return and therein it is mentioned that the grounds of release on parole were not found correct and so release of the petitioner was not recommended. For obvious reasons, this indicates that District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the case. Admittedly, the case of the petitioner was forwarded by the Jail Superintendent was of release on furlough for which no ground is prescribed under the rules. Only requirement as provided under Section 4 of the aforesaid Act relate to sentence of imprisonment of a particular limit and undergoing of a sentence beyond particular limit. Those requirements are satisfied in this case and when the District Magistrate treated it to be a case of release on parole, based on some grounds, which obviously were imaginary, his opinion cannot possibly be taken to be relevant for the purpose of the disposal of the case for release on furlough of the petitioner. I, therefore, find that the denial of the petitioner's prayer was on extraneous and arbitrary grounds and-was not at all justified.