GURSEWAK SINGH Vs. HARNAM SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision petition is directed against the order of the executing Court dated March 17, 1987, whereby the objection-petition filed on behalf of the judgment-debtors was accepted and the decree-holders were only given symbolical possession whereas they were entitled to the actual physical possession, as per the terms of the decree sought to be executed.

(2.) The plaintiffs filed the suit on December 1, 1969, for possession of the suit land which was decided on November 7, 1974. Ultimately, the said decree of the trial Court was maintained up to the High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 177 of 1978, which was decided on May 4, 1984. The decree-holders filed the execution application for possession of 88 bighas 12 biswas and 11 biswansis (266 bighas kham) on the basis of the said decree in their favour. The judgment-debtors filed objections setting up the claim that they were in possession of the land as the lessees on the basis of the two lease deeds dated August 14, 1984 and April 25, 1985, Exhibits Order 1 and Order 2, respectively from Shrimati Rajwant Kaur alias Amar Kaur, one of the co-powers of the land and, therefore, physical possession could not be ordered to be delivered to the decree-holders. The said objection-petition was contested by the decree-holders. It was denied that Shrimati Rajwant Kaur executed any lease deed in their favour as alleged. Moreover, the said Rajwant Kaur was not one of the decree-holders and, therefore, she could not executed any lease deed in their favour of the judgment-debtors. It was specifically pleaded that the alleged lease deeds were forged and fabricated and thus false documents. After framing the necessary issues and allowing the parties to lead evidence, the executing court found that the execution of the lease deeds, Exhibits O. 1 and O.2, was proved and that they were not forged ones as alleged by the decree-holders. The same were executed by one of the co-sharers Shrimati Rajwant Kaur and, thus, she having executed the lease-deeds, the judgment-debtors could not be dispossessed to deliver physical possession to the decree-holders. Dissatisfied with the same, the decree-holders have filed this revision petition in this Court.

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the execution application was filed on July 16, 1984. First objections were filed on November 24, 1984 by the judgment-debtors. Therein the plea of the lease deed dated August 14, 1984, was never taken. According to the learned counsel, if this lease deed would have been there at that time, the plea to that effect could be taken in the objection petition. The second objections were filed on January 30, 1985, in which, for the first time, the lease deed dated August 14, 1984, was pleaded. However, in that lease deed three khasra Nos. 147, 148 and 138 were not included. The decree-holders claimed possession at least of those khasra Nos. Thereafter, third objection petition was filed on April 26, 1985, in which the judgment-debtors set up another lease deed of those three khasra Nos. in their favour dated April 26, 1985. The learned counsel also pointed out that while Shrimats Rajwant Kaur was in the witness-box, the judgment-debtors themselves suggested that she was not the Rajwant Kaur who had expected the pleas deed and that she was some other lady. According to learned counsel, the said another lay was never produced by the judgment-debtors who according to their suggestions had executed the lease in their favour. He also submitted that the executing Court had itself observed in the impugned order as follows :