(1.) The factual matrix for the purposes of this application is that the petitioners have sought the quashing of the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the acquisition of their land. The applicant the Sutlaj Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited, Nakodar, preferred this application under Order 1 Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, for being impleaded as a party to the writ petition. The applicant claimed that the land dispute was acquired for the company, hence, it is a necessary and proper party. It was further claimed that any order passed in favour of the petitioners in the writ proceedings would adversely affect its interest.
(2.) The application is being opposed by the petitioners. It is contented that petitioners are the dominus lis. The applicant has no privity in the cause of action of the petitioners. The applicant may be successor-in-interest of the State but it is neither proper nor the necessary party under Act the only right given to the applicant is that they are entitled to lead evidence before the authorities under the Act for the purposes of determining the market value of the land. It is further contented that the dispute whether the persons for whom the land has been acquired are necessary and proper parties and can be impleaded is not res integra. It has been authoritatively laid down by the dictum of the Full Bench Kulbhushan Kumar and Co. V. State of Punjab and another, 1984 AIR(P&H) 55 by following the earlier Ful Bench decision reported in M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited V. Umrao and others, 1981 RajdhaniLR 403, that the persons for whose benefit the land has been acquired is neither a necessary nor a proper party and cannot be impleaded as such.
(3.) Counsel for the applicant controverts the submissions of the counsel for the writ petitioners and contends that the matter is covered by judgment of their lordships of the Supreme Court Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. V. Francis Victor Coutinho, 1980 AIR(SC) 1118 wherein it has been observed that 'person interested' in case of an acquisition of land for a company is (i) who is to pay the compensation under the agreement and in section 18 of the Act'person interested' is given an inclusive definition which should be liberally construed to embrace all persons who may directly or indirectly be interested either in the title of the land or in quantum of compensation. In view of the observations made the Supreme Court found that the company for whose benefit the land has been acquired under the Act is the person interested and is a necessary and proper party in writ proceedings for quashing the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act.