GURBAX SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The admitted facts are that the petitioner was granted two weeks' parole by the State Government u/s. 3 of the Punjab Good Conduct (Prisoners) Act, 1962 on 25th November, 1987, for the reason that his wife was suffering from some serious illness. However, before the expiry of this period of parole, he applied to the State Government on 5th December, 1987, for the extension of the parole period, as according to him, the ailment of his wife still persisted and she was required to be attended to. Before any action could be taken by the State Government on this request of his, he filed the present petition on 7th December, 1987, for a similar relief, i.e., the extension of the parole period.

(2.) It is now urged by the counsel for the petitioner that the wife of the petitioner is still under treatment and has been admitted to the P.G.I. Chandigarh and is likely to be operated upon on 14th January, 1988.

(3.) Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner I find that in view of the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, the relief prayed for cannot possibly be granted. This Sub-Section lays down that when a prisoner has been released on parole on the ground that a member of his family has either died or is seriously ill, the period of parole shall not be more than four weeks. In the face of this provision laying down a limitation on the extent of parole, the petitioner cannot be entitled to remain out of jail beyond four weeks from 25th November, 1987, i.e., the date when he concededly was released on parole. The learned counsel, however, urges that in view of clause (d) of Sub-Section (1) of this Section, the period of parole can be extended to any extent if the Court finds it desirable to do so. A bare reading of Sub-Section (1) brings out the falsity of the argument. This Sub-Section only deals with the grounds on which the parole can be ordered. The period of parole is controlled by the next following Sub-Section, i.e., Sub-Section (2) of Section 3. I, therefore, find no substance in this submission of the learned counsel.