(1.) In this execution first appeal the order of the learned Sub-Judge Ist Class, Rajpura, dated January 20, 1977 is under challenge.
(2.) An award was passed in favour of the respondent-society under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) whereby the Society was held entitled to recover from the appellant Rs. 34237.54 as principal amount, Rs. 2927.24 as interest and Rs. 1712.88 as costs; with future interest at 8 per cent per month. For the realization of the said amounts execution proceedings were instituted which were opposed by the judgment-debtor on various counts. The executing Court after recording evidence of the parties dismissed the petition which led to the filing of the present appeal by the judgment-debtor.
(3.) The learned counsel for the appellant has raised two contentions to challenge the validity of the award, namely, that the costs have been awarded without any basis and that the Arbitrator was not competent to grant future interest. In support of his first contention, the learned counsel relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Mathra Dass v. The State of Punjab and others, 1975 PunLJ 42, wherein it was held that the proceedings before the Arbitrator are quasi-judicial and the Arbitrator is bound to give reasons for his decision. Nothing has been said in the award as to how the costs were calculated or on what basis the costs were allowed. For his other contention regarding the future interest, the learned counsel relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Amar Kumar v. The State of Punjab and others, 1975 PunLJ 6, holding that there was no provision in the Act or in the Rules empowering the Arbitrator to award future interest. On account of the said legal infirmities, the learned counsel further submitted the whole award was liable to be declared inexecutable and for this purpose, he relied on Nirmal Singh v. The State of Punjab and others, 1976 PunLJ 41, wherein a Division Bench of this Court took the view that the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot set aside a part of the award and uphold the rest. The contentions of the learned counsel which are duly supported by the said decisions of this Court are well-merited. The other argument raised on behalf of the respondent that the executing Court cannot go beyond the decree and ignore the award even if some error of law has been committed by the Arbitrator while passing the award is not sustainable because Section 63 of the Act says that the award duly made would be deemed to be a decree which obviously means that only that award would be deemed to a decree which conforms with the provisions of the statute. As noticed above, the award suffers from two patent infirmities and it cannot be said that the award was duly made and would not be executable as a decree in the civil Court.