AMOLAK SINGH Vs. MADANLAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition under S. 15 (5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is brought from the decision of the Appellate Authority, Hissar, under that Act, confirming in appeal the decision of the Rent Controller of the district, and dismissing the application of the landlord, Amolak Singh, who sought for the eviction of Madan Lal, his tenant, from one of the shops situate at Hissar. Amolak Singh filed a petition for eviction of his tenant and the allegations were, that the tenant had not paid the rent and had materially impaired the value and utility of the shop, that the landlord required the premises for personal needs and that the tenant proved to be a nuisance to the occupiers of the buildings in the neighbourhood. In the present revision we are confined to the last ground which is covered by S. 13 (2) (iv) of the Act. The learned Rent Controller considered the evidence adduced on behalf of the landlord and was of the opinion that the said ground was not made out and accordingly, the petition for eviction was dismissed. The landlord came in appeal before the Appellate Authority, but did not succeed. The finding of the Rent Controller on the ground covered by S. 13 (2) (iv) of the Act was upheld and the entire evidence on the record was duly considered. Now the landlord has filed the present revision against the decision of the Appellant Authority.

(2.) IT is to be understood at the very outset that the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 15 (5) of the Act is some--what restricted. It is true that the High Court is not prohibited to go into the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties. Nevertheless, a finding of fact given by the Courts below need only be set aside if there are legitimate grounds for doing so. In Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, AIR 1963 SC 499, their Lordships observed that the power of the High Court under S. 15 (5) of the Act does not include the power to revise the concurrent findings without showing how those findings are erroneous. A similar observation was made by a Division Bench of this Court in F. S. Hugh v. Sukha Singh (1966) 68 Punj LR 899. It was held that the powers of the High Court under Section 15 (5) of the Act are much larger than those enjoyed under S. 115 of the Civil P. C. But this does not mean that the nature and jurisdiction of the High Court which essentially is revisional jurisdiction, would justify interference with the concurrent finding of fact, where that finding has been properly arrived at. With this state of law, it was incumbent on the part of the petitioner to point out in what manner the finding arrived at by the two authorities below could be stated not to have been properly arrived at. The very language used in Section 15 (5) of the Act indicates that the legality or the propriety of that finding has got to be considered. If the evidence was duly assessed and a reasonable view could be taken in favour of or against either of the parties, perhaps the revising court would not be justified to record a different finding under its revisional powers.

(3.) IT is also manifest that no details of the quarrel were mentioned in the eviction petition, nor any such details were given in the notice served upon the tenant. In those documents again, a sort of general statement was made that the tenant was a quarrelsome person and in my opinion that was not enough to cover the case under S. 13 (2) (iv) of the Act.