GAJJAN SINGH Vs. RAM LOK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS civil Revision under S. 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, is brought from the judgment of the Appellate Authority, Rupnagar, confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, Rupnagar. The petition of the landlord Ram Lok, seeking eviction of the tenant Gajjan Singh, was allowed.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are as below:-- Ram Lok filed a petition under S. 13 of the Act against Gajjan Singh and the allegation, inter alia was that he required the premises for his own use and occupation. The petition was contested by Gajjan Singh on a variety of grounds. After considering the evidence, however, the learned Rent Controller arrived at a finding in favour of the landlord and the petition was granted on 25-7-77. Thereafter, Gajjan Singh applied for a copy of the judgment on 2-8-1977 and on the very same day, the copy was ready for delivery. On 5-8-1977 Gajjan Singh took the delivery of the said copy but the appeal was filed on 23-8-1977. Under S. 15 (b) of the Act the limitation prescribed for filing an appeal against the order of eviction is 15 days from the date of such order and in computing the period of 15 days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against is to be excluded. A simple calculation in the present case would, therefore, indicate that the filing of the appeal was delayed by 12 days. Gajjan Singh filed an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, on the ground that his counsel Shri Santokh Singh gave him a wrong advice inasmuch as he considered that the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal was one month. It was asserted by Gajjan Singh that he was sick on 25-7-1977 and some time later came to Court and learnt about the decision. However, he applied for a certified copy of the order of eviction on 2-8-1977 which was ready for delivery on the very same day. It was asserted on his behalf that a wrong advice given by his counsel was a sufficient ground for condoning the delay.

(3.) SHRI V. K. Vashishta, the learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously contended that an affidavit was filed by Santokh Singh, Advocate, and the learned Appellate Authority was in error in disregarding that affidavit. In that affidavit, presumably, it was disclosed that the said counsel considered that the period of limitation was one month. The learned counsel relied on Punjabi University v. Acharya Swami Genesh, AIR 1972 SC 1973 and State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366 : (AIR 1972 SC 749 ). He further relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported as Smt. Shanti Devi v. Satyapal AIR 1964 Punj 289. In all these cases, it was pointed out that a bona fide mistake was committed by the counsel and that he acted in good faith. In other words, neither negligence nor inaction could be attributed and on those grounds it was held that the mistake of the counsel being bona fide, the ground ascribed was sufficient for invoking the aid of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In the Punjab University's case (supra), the mistake of the counsel was in the calculation of the period prescribed for limitation. The mistake was of only two days and on that basis, it was held that the mistake was bona fide. In State of West Bengal's case (supra) it was observed that there was neither negligence for inaction on the part of the aggrieved party and the counsel gave a wrong advice inasmuch as a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India was preferred in place of the other statutory remedy which was rendered time barred. It was held that the mistake of the counsel being bona fide, could be a good ground for condonation of delay. Their Lordships referred to Kumar Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Raj Rajeshwar Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276, in which the Judicial Committee made the following observations: "mistaken advice given by a legal practitioner may, in the circumstances of a particular case, give rise to sufficient cause within the (meaning of the) section though there is certainly no general doctrine which saves parties from the results of wrong advice. " It is, therefore, evident that every mistaken advice given by a counsel would not be a good ground to prove the sufficient cause for condoning the delay as the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court indicate that only bona fide mistakes committed in good faith are to be regarded as sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, Shri Vasishta further relied on Smt Shanti Devi's case (supra), but in that case also, the Division Bench found that the counsel had acted in good faith inasmuch as, because of wrong valuation, some other forum was chosen and the proceedings were instituted. It was held that the wrong advice given by the counsel in good faith was a sufficient cause. It is, therefore, evident that the crux of the matter would be the standing and status of the counsel, the circumstances under which a mistake is committed and absence of negligence or inaction so as to brand the conduct as one in good faith, and these factors would be taken into account while holding that a wrong advice given by a counsel would or would not be a sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Limitation Act.