GURDEV SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS order will also dispose of Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087 and 1427 of 1974.

(2.) THE State of Punjab issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on February 21, 1974, declaring its intention to acquire the land of the petitioners for setting up a new Mandi Township at Goraya. On the same day another notification was issued under S. 6 of the Act, in which it was mentioned that since the public purpose for which the land was being acquired was of urgent importance it would be open to the authorities concerned to proceed to take possession of the land in dispute under S. 17 (2) (c) of the Act. The petitioners have challenged the legality of these two notifications inter alia on the ground that the setting up of a new Mandi Township being a long drawn out process, in fact, the purpose of acquisitions was not of urgent importance. It has also been averred that the land of the petitioners was very fertile, yielding three crops in a year and that in the vicinity of the said land some other land which was not so productive was also available which could have been more conveniently acquired at less cost to the State exchequer.

(3.) MR . Jasbir Singh Ahluwalia, who has stated these facts on affidavit, deserves to be congratulated for indulging in plain speaking. But I am somewhat astonished at the stand taken on behalf of the State Government. In substance it amounts to denying a statutory Tribunal a right to perform its duty of hearing objections under S. 5--A of the Act. The Tribunal itself is appointed by the State Government and if the latter at the time of appointing the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal does not take care to appoint such persons who dispose of the cases expeditiously, the citizens cannot be made to suffer. It has been held in a large number of cases that the right of a land owner to raise objections under S. 5--A of the Act about the feasibility of the acquisition is an important right which cannot be set at naught by adopting circuitous means. I could have understood if the plea raised on behalf of the State had been that the instant purpose of acquisition was of urgent importance. Unfortunately, the defence put forth relates to a matter of policy, designed to cope with the situation arising out of the lethargic working of the Tribunals. Such a defence is totally extraneous to the scope of S. 17 of the Act. In the Printers House Private Ltd. v. Misri Lal, ILR (1970) 1 Punj and Har 76: (AIR 1970 Punj & Har 1) (FB), a Full Bench of this Court had the occasion to deal with such a matter when it observed (at p. 6 of AIR):-