INDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner owns about 7 Killas of land in village Morinda. A notification under Sections 4 and 17(2)(c) of the land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was issued on January 17, 1977, stating that the land detailed in it was needed by the Government for the construction of New Mandi Township, Morinda, that action under Section 17(2)(c) would be taken on the ground of urgent importance of the public purpose and that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply in regard to the acquisition. On the next day i.e. January 18, 1977, a notification under Section 6 was published wherein the provisions of Section 17(2)(c) of the Act were invoked. The notifications included the land of the petitioner. It is alleged that the petitioner remained in possession of the property but on June 22, 1977, a notice was issued by the Extra Assistant Colonization Officer, Punjab, exercising the powers of Collector under the Colonization of the Government Lands Act, 1912, to the effect that the petitioner had trespassed into the Government land and action was proposed to be taken against him under the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. The petitioner has challenged the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and the notice dated June 22, 1977.

(2.) It is contended by Mr. Nand Lal Dhingra, learned counsel for the petitioner that the construction of New Mandi Township was not of such an urgent nature that the provisions of Section 17 of the Act should have been invoked and the right of the petitioner under Section 5-A to file objections dispensed with. In support of his contention, he places reliance on Narayan v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 AIR(SC) 183, and L.P.A. No. 14 of 1977 (The State of Punjab v. Sudhir Kumar Dhingra and another, 1978 PunLJ 319), decided on August 8, 1978 : (D.B.).

(3.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it will be proper to refer to the law as laid down in Narayan's case . In that case some land was acquired for its development for utilisation as residential and industrial area. No facts were stated in the notification on account of which the Commissioner formed an opinion that the situation called for declaration-cum-directions under Section 17(4) of the Act and to dispense with the inquiries under Section 5A. Beg., J. as he then was, speaking for the Bench observed that opinion had to be based upon some relevant materials in order to pass the test which Courts do impose. There might, however, be cases where the mind of the authority concerned had not been applied at all, due to misunderstanding of the law or some other reasons, to what was legally imperative for it to consider. Thereafter, the learned Judge taking into consideration the facts of the case held that the public purpose indicated was the development of an area for industrial and residential purposes which on the face of it did not call for any such action barring exceptional circumstances, as to make immediate possession, without holding even a summary enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, imperative. On the other hand, such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable to least summary inquiries under Section 5A of the Act to be completed without any impediment whatsoever to the execution of the scheme. Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as to require the elimination of an inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. The learned Judge further observed that recital in the notification itself showed that the mind of the Commissioner was not applied at all to the question whether the urgency was of such a nature as to require elimination of the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. If it was, at least the notifications gave no inkling of it at all. On the other hand, its literal meaning was that nothing beyond matters stated there were considered. The learned Judge also observed that the recital did not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. It was certainly a case in which the recital was at least defective. As to on whom the burden rested that some exceptional circumstances existed which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, the learned Judge observed as follows :