BHARAT ENGINEERING CO Vs. ASSESSING AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS primary and indeed the sole challenge herein is directed against the retrospective amendment of entry No. 34 of Schedule B of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, as applicable to Haryana; by the Punjab General Sales Tax (Haryana Amendment and Validation) Act, 1972, whereby entry No. 34, pertaining to agricultural implements, was substituted and was to be deemed to have always been substituted as under: Agricultural implements but not including pumping sets, threshers and discs.

(2.) IT is plain and indeed not disputed on behalf of the respondents that retro-spectivity has been given to the amendment with effect from 1st May, 1949, when the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, came into force.

(3.) NOW , it is the common case that the incidence of taxation here is attracted by virtue of Section 5 (2) (a) (ii) and the third proviso thereto of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (as existing on 17th October, 1972), when the Haryana Act 19 of 1972 came into force read with Section 9 (l) (a) (i) of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973. At the very outset, it may be highlighted that Mr. B. K. Jhingan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, frankly conceded that he could not even remotely assail the prospective operation of the amendment made in entry No. 34 by the amending Haryana Act 19 of 1972. The sole attack levelled by him, therefore, was to the retrospective operation of the amendment. The counsel contended with considerable vehemence that by making this amendment retrospective with effect from the original enactment of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, retrospectivity has been given to the provisions for a period extending over more than two decades. It was contended that during this period neither sales tax nor purchase tax was leviable on agricultural implements, and discs and harrows in which the petitioner-firm deals were undoubtedly within the ambit of the said term till they have been expressly excluded therefrom by the amendment. The primary contention, therefore, was that the long period of retrospectivity given to the amendment was one of the major factors in making it unreasonable and arbitrary and, therefore, within the mischief of being violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (l) (f) of the Constitution. Mr. Jhingan was, however, fair enough to concede that the mere length of time by itself was not necessarily enough to render the retrospectivity of a taxing statute void on this ground.