SPEDDING DINGA SINGH AND CO Vs. PUNJAB STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN pursuance of the orders of Dulat and Pandit. JJ. dated September 12, 1963, in General Sales Tax cases Nos. 8 to 10 of 1960, the Financial Commissioner punjab, has referred the following question to this Court under Sub-section (3) of section 22 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act (46 of 1948), hereinafter called the act, --"whether on the facts and circumstances of this case, the sale of timber was for use in the generation or distribution of electrical energy within the meaning of Section 5 (2) (a) (iv) of the Act?" the facts giving rise to the above-quoted question and the steps leading to this reference are not only brief but are also beyond dispute. Messrs. Spedding Dinga singh and Company of Pathankot, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, supplied timber to the Punjab Public Works Department -- Electricity Branch --for construction of Kotla Power House during the period 1953 to 1956. Before the assessing authority under the Act, the assessee claimed that for arriving at the "taxable turnover" in respect of the assessment of the general sales-tax for the years 1953-54. 1954-55 and 1955-56, it was entitled to deduct therefrom the amount of the said sales of timber in exercise of the assessee's right conferred on it by the following provision contained in Section 5 (2) (a) (iv) of the Act --

(2.) IN order to answer the question of law referred to us, all that we have to decide is whether timber supplied for construction of a power house can be said to be supplied for use "in the generation or distribution" of electric energy

(3.) AS we agree with Mr. N. K. Sodhi, learned counsel for the assessee that in case of two possible alternative constructions or in ease of doubt or ambiguity in the true scope and meaning of the relevant taxing provision, we should lean in favour of the assessee; we need not refer to the cases on which learned counsel wanted to rely for that proposition. Nor is it necessary to dilate on the second argument of general nature advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee on the authority of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Innamuri Gopalam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1963) 14 STC 742 (SC), to the effect that there is no equity in a taxing statute and either the subject is within it or not on the words of the relevant enactment and that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the relevant words. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further laid down in that case that the entire matter is governed wholly by the words of the provision and if the taxpayer is within the plain terms of the exemption he cannot be denied its benefit by calling in and any supposed intention of the exempting authority, though the matter is different if such intention can be gathered from the construction of the relevant words of the statute.