MEHAR SINGH Vs. GURANDITTA CHAUDHARY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The applicant is the landlord. He sought eviction of the tenant, who is the respondent, on three grounds (a) non-payment of arrears of rent, (b) requirement of the demised part of the premises for his personal occupation, and (c) the nuisance character of the tenant. The arrears of rent were paid and the third ground, was also dropped before the Appellate Authority. So the only ground that survived before the Appellate Authority was that the landlord requires the demised part of the premises for his own occupation. The Rent Controller as also the Appellate Authority have concurrently come to the conclusion that the requirement in this respect stated by the landlord is not claimed in good faith, a finding of fact with regard to which ordinarily this Court will not interfere unless special circumstances justify the same.

(2.) Held that, leaving the facts aside the learned counsel has gone to some of the decided cases. The first case is a Full Bench decision of this Court Sant Ram-Des Raj V/s. Karam Chand, 1962 64 PunLR 758, and the learned counsel relies upon the statement in paragraph 20, but all that was said there was that the word 'requires' in Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act 3 of 1949), involves something more than mere wish and it has in it an element of need to an extent at least. This rather speaks against the landlord because it is this element of need which he has failed to prove in the present case, and that is why his eviction application has been rejected. The other case referred to by the learned counsel is Anandhayee Ammal V/s. S.M. Khaya and Co.,1967 1 MhLJ 368, in which the learned Judge held that "it has been repeatedly held by our Courts that in case a landlord or landlady requires his or her only premises for his or her own occupation the question of bona fides is alien for consideration and need not at all be gone into unless there are compelling circumstances to disbelieve the version of the landlord or the landlady, totally". But such a sweeping statement of law does not prevail in this court and, I think, in this respect the law as stated under East Punjab Act 3 of 1949 by Falshaw, C.J. in Jetha Nand V/s. Ram Chander,1966 PunLR 377, is the one that has been accepted as correct. The learned Chief Justice held that when a landlord says that he wants to occupy the house himself, there should be no difficulty in the Court's believing him unless cogent reasons exist for doubting his bona fides in this respect, and the only test of the genuineness of his intention of living in his own house after ousting his tenant is to see whether in fact he occupies the house, and the land has provided a safeguard to tenants in this respect in that if the landlord who has obtained possession of his house after obtaining ejectment of the tenant does not occupy it within a certain period, the tenant can move the Court to be put back into possession. I followed this in Inderjit V/s. Nanak Chand, Civil Revision No. 309 of 1965, decided on April 4, 1966. So, ordinarily the statement of the landlord whether he wants vacation of whole or part of his only house for his own occupation is to be accepted, except where cogent reasons exist for doubting his statement. In the present case the landlord has failed to satisfy the authorities below that there has been any substantial change in his family circumstances as compared to the time when he let the demised part of the premises which supports his claim of bona fide occupation of that part for himself. This in itself is a cogent reason which disentitles the landlord to the grant of prayer he made. So none of these cases is helpful to the arguments on the side of the landlord.

(3.) This revision application fails and is dismissed, but there is no order in regard to costs.