GURDIALO Vs. DHAN KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The dispute in this case relates to the landed property which was originally owned by one Kura. Kura and Nand Singh were two brothers who have since died. Mst. Dhan Kaur plaintiff is the widow of Kura and Mst. Gurdialo defendant is the widow of Nand Singh. On Kura's death the property left by him was mutated in the name of his son Karam Singh and on his death the property was mutated in the name of Mst. Jas Kaur, daughter of Kura. On the death of Mst. Jas Kaur the property was mutated in the names of Mst. Dhan Kaur and Mst. Gurdialo in equal shares. It may be mentioned that almost immediately after the death of Kura his widow Mst. Dhan Kaur entered into a karewa marriage with Nand Singh. The present suit was brought by Dhan Kaur for a declaration that mutation of one-half property of Kura had been wrongly made in the name of Mst. Gurdialo and that the plaintiff alone was entitled to the entire property originally belonging to Kura and now left by Mst. Jas Kaur. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground that Mst. Dhan Kaur had ceased to be the widow of Kura after her karewa marriage with Nand Singh and that both the parties to the present litigation now stood on equal footing because both of them were the widows of Nand Singh and were entitled to succeed collaterally to the property left by the line of Karam Singh. The plaintiff's case was that her entering into karewa marriage with the brother of her husband entailed forfeiture neither of the property left by him nor of her future rights of succession qua that property. The point that fell for decision was whether after the death of Jas Kaur, Dhan Kaur had any right to succeed to Kura's property in preference to Gurdialo. The suit of Dhan Kaur was decreed by the trial Court and the said decree was confirmed by the learned District Judge, Bhatinda. Mst. Gardialo, defendant has come up to this Court in a petition for revision.

(2.) It may be mentioned here that this petition for revision was filed originally in the High Court of erstwhile Pepsu State where the law prevailing at the time provided for a petition for revision being filed in cases where value for jurisdiction was below a certain figure.

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner urges that the custom as prevailing amongst the agriculturists of Punjab has not been properly interpreted by the two Courts below. His contention is that Mst. Dhan Kaur by her karewa marriage with Nand Singh ceased to be the widow of Kura and was thereafter not entitled to succeed to the estate left by Mst. Jas Kaur. He relies on rulings reported in Mst. Jaidevi v. Harnam Singh, 117 PR 1888, Hardam Singh and another v. Mst. Mahan Kaur, 113 PunLR 1910 and Mst. Desi v. Lehna Singh, 46 PR 1891. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand urges that the karewa marriage by a widow with the brother of her last husband has neither the effect of forfeiture of her life estate in the husband's property nor that of forfeiture of her right to future succession qua the husband's property. He relies on para 33 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law, Kanhaya Singh, v. Mst. Premi, 322 PunLR 1913 and Gaman v. Mst. Aman, 171 PR 1888. I am of the opinion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent must prevail. The custom definitely provides that a karewa marriage with the brother of the husband does not entail the forfeiture of the widow's right in her husband's property. There is no reason to limit this rule of custom to the property which she has already inherited and the rule is in my judgment equally applicable to the property to which she would have succeeded but for her karewa marriage with the brother of her deceased husband. The remarriage of the widow with the brother of the deceased husband does not cause forfeiture of her rights because of the reason that she continues to remain in the same family and this reason equally applies to her future rights of succession. In any case the scope of revisions under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, is very limited and in the present case I see no ground for interference with the decrees of the two Courts below who admittedly had the jurisdiction to pass the same. I would, therefore, dismiss this petition for revision with costs.