JAGIR SINGH Vs. DHERU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE only point involved in this Letters Patent Appeal is one of limitation. The facts which are not disputed before us are these:

(2.) JAGIR Singh appellant appointed one Nathn his 'mukhtar-i-am' (general attorney), on 15-10-1937. Leaving Nathu to manage his affairs and look after his property in India, Jagir Singh appellant proceeded to Singapore in 1937. He returned from there in January 1951. Nathu, his attorney, had died on 25-5-1945, without rendering accounts for the moneys realised by him on behalf of the appellant in his absence. The appellant asked Dheru and others, respondents, the legal representatives of nathu, to render accounts and to deliver the documents relating to his property. This having been refused the present suit for the said purpose was instituted against the legal-representatives on 1-5-1951. A preliminary objection with regard to limitation was raised by the defendants. It was contended that the suit was governed by Article 89, Limitation Act and the same having been instituted more than three years after Nathu's, death, when the agency terminated, was barred by time. The trial Court decided the issue against the defendants, holding that the suit was governed by Article 120, and passed a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendants, the district Judge agreed with the finding that Article 120 applied and that the suit was within time. However, the preliminary decree was set aside on some other grounds and the case remanded for fresh decision after framing of further issues on merits. The defendants preferred a second appeal which was heard and accepted by a learned single Judge of this Court. The learned Judge is of the view that the suit, though not brought against the agent but against his legal-representatives, is covered by article 89 and having been instituted more than three years after the termination of the agency on the agent's death was barred by time. This is an appeal by the plaintiff under the Letters Patent.

(3.) THE only question that has to be determined is whether the case is governed by article 89 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act. If it is, the suit would certainly be barred by time; for the limitation of three years under the Article began to run on the death of Nathu on 25-5-1945, when the agency terminated. On the other hand, if the Article does not apply, the suit would be governed by the residuary rule of limitation of six years under Article 120 and would be well within time. Article 89 of the Limitation Act says-Description of suit. Period of Time from which period limitation. begins to run. By a principal against Three years. When the account is, during his agent for the continuance of the moveable property agency demanded and received by the latter refused or, where no such and not accounted demand is made, when the for. agency terminates. The present is certainly a suit by a principal for moveable property received by the agent and not accounted for. By virtue of the provisions of Section 201, Contract act, the agency terminated on the death of the agent and that gave rise to a cause of action to the plaintiff and would be the starting point of limitation under the Article. The only point that remains to be seen is whether the present suit by the principal can be regarded as one "against his agent".