ABDUL LATIF Vs. DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT LAHORE DIVISION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE short point for decision in the present case is whether an appeal lies from an order refusing to make a direction under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. It appears that one Abdul Latif who was employed as a Booking Clerk on the North Western Railway was removed from service of the Crown on 9-81942. He submitted a number of petitions under Section 15 of the Act of 1936 for payment of delayed wages, including the one dated 31-8-1945 which forms the subject of the present case and in which he claims payment of delayed wages for the period commencing with the 1st April 1945 and ending with the 30th september 1945. The Authority appointed by the Provisional Government to hear and decide the claims arising under the statute came to the conclusion that there was a bona fide dispute between the employer and the employee as to whether the removal was or was not valid in the eye of law and, consequently, that in view of the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 15 the Authority was not at liberty to make a direction for the payment of wages. The application was accordingly dismissed without issuing a notice to the opposite party. The petitioner appealed to the District Judge of Delhi, but the latter declined to entertain the appeal on the ground that no appeal could lie against an order refusing to make a direction. The petitioner has come to this Court in revision and the question for this Court is whether the learned District Judge has come to a correct determination in point of law.

(2.) SUB-SECTION (3) of Section 15 provides that when any application under Subsection (2) of the said section is entertained, the Authority may direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted from his wages, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit. Sub-section (4) empowers the Authority to direct that a penalty not exceeding Rs. 50/- be paid to the employer if the application is malicious or vexatious. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 is in the following terms:

(3.) SECTION 17 provides clearly and in unambiguous language that in certain circumstances an appeal can be preferred against a direction made under Subsection (3) or Sub-section (4) of Section 15, but it is com-pletely silent as to whether an appeal can lie from an order refusing to make a direction. The question which arises and which is by no means freedom difficulty is whether the expression "direction" can be deemed to include the expression "failure to make a direction" or "refusal to make a direction. "