JALANDHAR IMPROVEMENT TRUST Vs. IMPROVEMENT TRUST TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS order shall dispose of all other connected writ petitions including those, which have been filed by the land owners for enhancement of compensation, which are also listed before us. Further, all these matters arise out of the same acquisition notification issued under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for short 'the Act').

(2.) LEARNED senior counsel for petitioner-Improvement Trust made the one and only submission that the tribunal which rendered this impugned award was not properly constituted according to the mandate of Section 60 of the Act as it consisted of the President alone and none else like assessors etc. Learned senior counsel based his submission on the ratio of a judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court reported in Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal v. Parkash Wanti (Smt.) (Dead) and another, 1996(3) RRR 145 : (1995)5 SCC 159, and contended that any award passed by a Tribunal, which is not properly constituted, would be void ab-initio, thus, the impugned award at the very outset needs to be set aside and consequently, these cases are to be relegated to a competent tribunal constituted in terms of Section 60 of the Act for a fresh adjudication.

(3.) WE have considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for parties and perused the Award as also the Act. We have also carefully read the judgment under reference in Karnal Improvement Trust case (supra). This is clearly held in the judgment that under this Act, an award of the Tribunal is designated to be the award of a Court, therefore, the Tribunal under this Act is a Court. Hence, each member of the Tribunal would be entitled to have his own opinion in the determination of quantum of compensation or measurements of land under acquisition. The Chairperson of the Tribunal as a Civil Judge is empowered to sign the award on behalf of the Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the opinion of the majority members of the Tribunal shall be drafted as the decree of the Tribunal. Mandatory quorum for the constitution of a Tribunal is three and the award of the Tribunal is a decree of a Civil Court. President of the Tribunal is also a member and each one of them is liable to be removed on any of the grounds enumerated in the Act. More importantly, each member of the tribunal is to function independently. Mere fact that the President of the Tribunal will record evidence, in absence of assessors, or that he has power to preside over the Tribunal and compel presence of witnesses, or secure evidence, does not perforce minimise or undermine the composition of, as also the continuance and functions of assessors as the members of Tribunal. Temporary absence of a member including the President may entail, by implication, his removal and appointment of a substitute member. Thus, it would reinforce the principle that in the discharge of the functions as a member, the presence and participation of each member of the Tribunal would be mandatory, unless his absence becomes unavoidable and it is beyond his control. This is also held that when the Tribunal consists of three members, the opinion has to be of the composite body, and not of the President alone. Powers vested in the President to decide the questions of law and title or procedure do not undermine the position of assessor members of the Tribunal,nor of any other related matters. When the Tribunal determines the compensation or a dispute as to the extent and quality of land under acquisition, this is always the decision of Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the majority view would prevail and that would be the executable decree. It is, thus, clear that the Tribunal is a three member statutory body and it does not consist of the Presiding Judge alone. This is also clear that all the three members of Tribunal should be present and participate at the time of enquiry unless unavoidable and also hear the matter on merits. Decision of the Tribunal, if not unanimous due to some cleavage of opinion, would be as per the majority. Thus, an award and decree passed by the Tribunal under the Act is of the entire Tribunal and not of the Presiding Officer alone, even though he signs the award on behalf of the Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the opinion of each member is a judgment but the enforceable award and decree would be the view of the majority. Hon'ble the Apex Court has distinguished the ratio of judgment of Privy Council reported in AIR 1917 Privy Council 142 (Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin), in the Karnal Improvement Trust case (supra). In Privy Council's judgment, it was held as :