RAJWINDER KAUR Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of complaint dated 20.10.2003 filed under sections 406/498-A/494/420/504/506/34 IPC pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ferozepur and also the summoning order dated 5.4.2007 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Fazilka summoning the petitioner herein under section 504/506 IPC as well as subsequent proceedings arising thereto qua the petitioner.

(2.) THE main ground on which the petitioner has sought quashing of the complaint is that even if all the allegations made in the complaint qua the petitioner are taken on their face value no offence under section 504 and 506 IPC is made out against the petitioner and thus, the complaint as well as subsequent proceedings and the summoning order passed by the learned Magistrate is nothing but misuse of the process of the court.

(3.) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in support of her contention that no offence under sections 504 and 506 IPC is made out if the allegations as levelled are taken on its face value has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Niwas Kosalia v. Narender Kumar Jain 1991(2) RCR(Criminal) 518 wherein this Court has been pleased to lay down as under :- "11. Even if the conversation as stated above is taken to be correct, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the complainant is a practising lawyer on taxation side at Bhiwani and the present petitioner is also a public servant, discharging his duties as an appellate authority i.e. Joint Taxation Commissioner. It is presumable that they must be meeting each other in discharge of their duties. Even if the complainant is allowed to say that the said conversation has caused alarm or threat of injury, then that imaginary injury and harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper should complaint of it. The complainant being an advocate, was expected, not to bother about what allegedly had been said to him by the petitioner on telephone. To my mind, advocate of ordinary sense and temper would never complaint of an such harm. This view of mine gets ample support from a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. While interpreting it their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan Hap Ibrahim Khan, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1773 :