DIWAN SHAH Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner-management of M/s. Diwan Shah & Sons Pvt. Ltd., Jagadhri has approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashing the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Faridabad, dated 25.8.1992 (annexure P-1). Initially, the award was questioned on two grounds. The first related to the validity of the appointment of Presiding Officer. It was urged that the Presiding Officer had not been validly appointed and, therefore, his orders are also not valid. But the precise question with reference to the validity of the appointment of the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal was the subject matter of some writ petition before this Court and a Full Bench of this Court in Tul-Par Machine & Tool Company, Faridabad v. Shri Joginder Pal, Workman and others, 1983 2 ILR(P&H) 357 while holding that the appointment of Presiding Officer was not valid and quashing the appointment of the Presiding Officer, also held that the awards delivered by the Presiding Officer are not necessarily vitiated on the ground that his appointment has been set aside. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner fairly did not press this point.

(2.) The second point urged before me is that the Industrial Tribunal was not competent to decide the question relating to the supply of uniforms and pad to the workmen in view of the provisions of Section 7A read with Schedules II an III of the Industrial Disputes Act.

(3.) The workmen claimed that they should have been supplied uniforms and pad by the management. The management disputed its liability and contended that in no other similar factory these facilities were extended to the workmen. But, now in the writ petition, it is urged by the petitioner-management that the Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act could decide or adjudicate all such industrial disputes which are specified in the Second or the Third Schedule, and perform such other functions as may be assigned to it under the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner by referring to the Schedules II and III, pointed out that the question whether the management is bound to supply uniforms to the workmen is not one of the matters which could be referred, as they are not specifically mentioned in those schedules. But the learned counsel for the workman contended that item-11 of the Third Schedule provides that the Industrial Tribunal is competent to decide ''any other matter that may be prescribed''. He further contended that this question now raised before this Court that the Industrial Tribunal was not competent to decide the question as there was no provision in the Act and the Schedules or in the shape of standing orders/agreement or any other prescription, was not raised before the Industrial Tribunal and, therefore, he was deprived of an opportunity of putting forth a fitting reply.