SHRI KANT Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Before the commencement of the Constitution of India, the concept of fundamental rights and constitutional rights was unknown to our polity. Remedy available to the citizens against the violation of their rights was to file an action in the civil Court for passing an appropriate decree. After a long debate lasting over two years, the members of the Constituent Assembly gave us the Constitution of India which contains a fine synthesis of rights and duties of the individuals as well as the obligations of the State. It also sets out the goals of justice and equality. It seeks to define and delineate the fields of operation of the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. Part-III of the Constitution enumerates those rights which are popularly known as fundamental rights. The framers of the Constitution thought these rights to be so sacrosanct that they provided a remedy directly before the highest Court of the country against the violation of rights enumerated in Part-III. With a view to provide forum for quick redressal of the grievances of the citizens and other persons against the State and other public authorities, the High Courts have been invested with extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. These powers can be exercised not only for enforcing the fundamental rights but also for other rights. The High Courts are possessed with the power to issue not only five well known writs but also pass orders and directions in the nature of those writs. The magnitude and scope of the powers vesting in the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution have been adequately explained and defined by the judge-made law. It is now well settled that the High Court can exercise writ jurisdiction in all those cases where it finds patent violation of fundamental, constitutional and other legal rights of the individuals by the State and its agencies. Every State action can be made subject matter of judicial review and the High Court can issue writ, order or direction wherever it finds that the State has encroached upon the right of the individual or where the State action is found to be arbitrary or malicious. The graph of the cases instituted in the High Court for issuance of writs, orders or directions has consistently shown an upward trend. One of the factors which is responsible for multi-fold increase in the litigation is the awareness of the citizens of their rights and duties with a faith which the people of the country have reposed in the institution of judiciary.

(2.) However, the increase in the volume of the litigation has cast much greater burden on the High Courts which are to dispense justice between the parties whether it is an individual or the State. In order to prevent misuse of the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred upon the institution of the High Court, rules of self-imposed restraint have been evolved. Ordinarily the High Courts refrain from coming to the aid of a party who sleeps over his/its rights. The Court is also not inclined to entertain a petition where an effective alternative remedy is available to the petitioner. The writ jurisdiction is also not exercised where issuance of an order in favour of the petitioner may result in restoration of an illegality. A public authority cannot be directed to act in violation of the provisions of the Constitution or any other statutory provision. The High Court also guards itself against the abuse of its process by unscrupulous persons. It insists that the petitioner must make declaration of full facts before it, must not try to suppress any fact and no attempt should be made to mislead it. The rule that the High Court should not hear a petition on merits when the petitioner is guilty of suppressing facts or misleading the Court is based on sound public policy, namely, that the Court must guard itself from those who want to pollute the course of justice. The tendency amongst a section of litigants which has grown over the years to persuade the Court by hook or crook to pass order in its favour has to be discouraged at the threshold in order to maintain purity in the system of administration of justice. This is also sine qua non for maintaining the public confidence in the institution of judiciary as a whole.

(3.) We have prefaced our judgment by making the above observations because after having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are convinced that the petitioners of this petition are guilty of contumacious conduct, namely, making of patently false statements and, therefore, they have disentitled themselves from any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. A brief back-drop of the case.