BANARSI DASS Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, who joined the Haryana Roadways, Kamal, as Helper on 21.7.1971, has filed this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing the orders of punishment Annexures P/1 to P/3 and P/5 to the writ petition. The petitioner was later promoted as Fitter in 1991, was served with a charge-sheet for not repairing vehicle No. 183 while working in the night shift on 6.7.1994. After holding an enquiry and where the petitioner had produced 9 defence witnesses, the disciplinary authority while concurring with the report of the enquiry officer imposed a punishment of stoppage of one increment vide order dated 24.8.1995. Again a charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner for not repairing vehicle No. 7704 on 16.5.1995 when the front pin of the vehicle came out on route. In this also after holding an enquiry, punishment of stoppage of one increment was imposed on 23.12.1996. Still another charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner for not repairing vehicle No. 2612 on 9.12.1995. Enquiry was held and another punishment of stoppage of one annual increment was imposed upon the petitioner. Fourth charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner on 31.10.1995 for not effecting repairs of vehicle No. 7609 and 638 while he was on duty on 23.8.1995. Aggrieved from all these orders of punishment the petitioner has .filed the present writ petition.

(2.) We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length. It is conceded by her that alternative remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner, which has not been availed of, in spite of the fact that the orders of punishment were passed quite some time back. We are of the view that the alternative statutory remedy available to the petitioner is an obstacle in the entertainment of this petition at this stage, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel contended that there is violation of principles of natural justice as the petitioner was not permitted to lead his defence in the departmental enquiry. While submitting her arguments in relation to the 4th charge-sheet, she argued that the order is liable to be set aside for denial of proper opportunity, but we have noticed that in the impugned order itself the disciplinary authority has observed that the petitioner had declined to lead any defence before the enquiry officer. However, this fact is also disputed by the petitioner in the reply to the show cause notice which he submitted before the authorities concerned.

(3.) In view of the above factual controversies, we consider this case to be a fit one where the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory remedy available to him in accordance with rules. If the petitioner prefers any such appeal before the competent authority, the same-shall be disposed of by the concerned authorities by a speaking order and after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard personally or through counsel. Such final order would be passed by the authority within one month from the date such appeal or representation is received in his office along with the copy of this order.