PARKASH CHAND CHAHAL Vs. SHEELA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent Act filed by the appellant seeking divorce from the wife. The petition for divorce was dismissed by the Trial Court as well as by the learned Single Judge. The divorce was sought on two grounds namely desertion and cruelty. The plea of desertion having been given up before the learned Single Judge, we have only to see whether the appellant-husband is entitled to seek a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty. The two courts have concurrently found that the wife is not guilty of any cruelty. On the other hand the learned Single Judge has found that the appellant husband was cruel to the wife. It has been found as a fact that neither the respondent's father nor the wife's father were having any financial status as the husband's father used to cut grass whereas the wife's father was a petty leather merchant. In view thereof there is nothing wrong with the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the wife's father could not compel the husband to give up employment in order to start the business. What business the wife's father could suggest when he himself was not a man of any financial status? The husband was not employed even at the time of marriage and it was only after two years of marriage that he could get employment in the Food Corporation of India. It has been noted by the learned Single Judge that the wife had been expressing her willingness to come back to the husband. At one stage the wife alleged mal-treatment on the part of the husband for desertion and it is on this count that the learned Single Judge had found that the husband was cruel and not the wife. In any case even if this aspect of the matter can be forgotten by the Court no cruelty on the part of the wife has been proved. We have gone through the entire evidence and are not in a position to record any finding about the cruelty on the part of the wife. The couple has three children and in view thereof we are unable to find any force in the argument of the counsel for the appellant that the parties should be separated at this stage after a period of 30 years of marriage on the ground that the present case is a case of broken marriaage. Finding no merit in the appeal, the same is hereby dismissed.