ROSHAN LAL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called 'the Code') the petitioner Roshan Lal has sought the quashing of an order dated April 8, 1986 passed by the learned Sub -Divisional Magistrate, Fazilka, initiating proceedings under Sec. 145 of the Code against the petitioner and respondent No. 2 Smt. Bhagwanti.

(2.) THE relevant facts are that a report dated April 5. 1986, under Section 145 of the Code was filed by the Station House Officer of Police Station, City Abohar, before the Sub -Divisional Magistrate, Fazilka, alleging that one Jaipal was in possession of the shop in dispute. He had employed the petitioner Roshan Lal as a servant to work in the shop. Jaipal died in 1980 and thereafter the petitioner had been running the shop and rendering accounts to Bhagwanti, respondent No. 2, widow of Jaipal. The relations between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 became strained and the petitioner wanted to occupy the shop. It was submitted that the shop had become a cause for dispute between the parties and the situation required the initiation of the proceedings under section 145 of the Code. In pursuance of this report notices under Section 145(1) of the Code were issued to the parties by the Sub -Divisional Magistrate vide the impugned order dated April 8, 1986.

(3.) THE other objection of the petitioner against the impugned order is that the order is not in conformity with the provisions of Section 145(1) of the Code. This objection is not without merit. It is provided in Section 145(1) of the Code that when an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists on a dispute regarding possession of a property within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims in respect of the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. It is, therefore, clear that before an order under Section 145(1) of the Code is passed by an Executive Magistrate, he must satisfy himself that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists and it is incumbent upon him to state the grounds of his being so satisfied in the order. However, in the present case such satisfaction has not been recorded by the Sub -Divisional Magistrate in the impugned order. This order, therefore, violates the ingredients of Section 145(1) of the Code.