HARI MITTAL Vs. B.M. SIKKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Revision under Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act has arisen out of a petition filed by the respondent for seeking ejectment on the ground of personal necessity, of the petitioner from the house in dispute. The Rent Controller negatived the plea of personal necessity on the ground that the demised premises was a Scheduled building, but ordered the ejectment upholding the other plea of change of user. The Appellate Authority reversed the finding that the demised premises was a scheduled building and confirmed the order of ejectment both on the change of user and personal necessity.

(2.) THE principal challenge against the order of ejectment before the learned Single Judge was that though the demised premises was a residential building, but as it had been let out to the petitioner, who was practising as an advocate and maintaining his office in a part of the building, it became a Scheduled building and ejectment could not be ordered on the ground of personal necessity. The learned Single Judge, doubting the correctness of B.S. Kamthania v. Smt. Hardial Kaur, 1980(1) RCJ 533, referred the case to a Division Bench. The Division Bench, in turn, referred the matter to a Full Bench, who after holding that a residential building let out for non-residential purpose by the landlord without obtaining the written permission of the Rent Controller in terms of Section 11 of the Act, would continue to be residential building, remitted the case back to us for final disposal. By the time the case came up for hearing before us, the significance of the controversy as to the nature of the building was rendered meaningless by the extension and applicability of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to the Union Territory of Chandigarh vide notification No. GSR 1287 E dated December 15, 1986 by the Central Government. The respondent-landlord being a specified landlord is entitled to recover the possession even of the Scheduled building for his own occupation by virtue of the provisions of Section 13-A introduced by the said amendment. The learned counsel for the tenant, however, urged that before a landlord can avail of the said provision, he has to make an application specifically pleading that he is specified landlord and requires the building for his own occupation. We are unable to accept this contention. All the necessary facts for the attraction of the provision of Section 13-A have already been pleaded and the learned counsel for the respondent was fully justified in invoking the said provision for maintaining the order of ejectment. This petition, therefore, must fail and is hereby dismissed, but the petitioner is allowed three months' time to vacate the premises provided he pays the arrears of rent, if any, together with the rent for these three months within fifteen days from today. No costs. Petition dismissed.