INCOME-TAX OFFICER Vs. JAGDISH RAM MANAK CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN a complaint filed by the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle III, Jalandhar, against the respondents under sections 276c and 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for having filed the return for the assessment year 1979-80, on the basis of a wrong or false statement of accounts with a view to evade tax, the respondents have been concurrently discharged by the lower courts for the reason that: "it has not been proved that the return of the statement of accounts filed by the accused was false. " The complainant has filed this petition to impugn these orders.

(2.) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, I find that the above noted conclusion of the courts below is wholly untenable particularly when the stage of the case is kept in view, i. e. , the stage of framing the charge. Before adverting to facts, I deem it proper to state here the principle or the consideration which the court has to keep in view at this stage of the case. According to their Lordships of the Supreme Court: " Even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of a charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. " (See Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52, 55 ).

(3.) WITHOUT going into details, I form the opinion that in the instant case, the statements (exhibits P-l to P-3) of at least one of the accused, namely, Manak Chand Jain, were good enough to frame a charge against him/them in view of the above-noted principle of law laid down by the final court. Material part of the statement (exhibit P-l) reads that the sales reflected in the udhar bahis were not reflected in the regular books of account. This admission, to my mind, was enough for framing a charge against this accused, who, concededly, had filed the income-tax returns. In the light of this conclusion of mine, I do not feel the necessity of adverting to the other evidence on record. At this stage, Shri Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-accused, contends, rather vehemently, that on the basis of the above-noted statement, the respondents other than Manak Chand Jain and the firm could not possibly be charged for the offences alleged against them. No such point appears to have been urged before the lower courts and, therefore, the said courts have not adverted to the same.